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ABSTRACT 
 
A People’s History of Philosophy: The Development and Ideological Segregation of 
Black Nationalism.  
(August 2011) 
Judith Colleen Bohr, B.A., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Tommy Curry 
 
 The primary objective of this thesis is to advocate for Black Nationalism’s full 
inclusion in the academic field of political philosophy.  By bringing the thinkers in the 
Black Nationalist tradition into this discourse, the field of philosophy stands to gain 
important insight into the prejudices and unexamined assumptions that plague academia. 
I will flesh out the nature of these assumptions using the works of Black Nationalists like 
Angela Davis, George Jackson and Joy James. This will show that reading Black 
Nationalists as social theorists enables philosophers to unveil sources of knowledge 
about political economies by looking at the history of imperialism in a comprehensive 
manner.  
 The second section is devoted to an examination of how the Black Panther 
Party’s relationship to the state reveals the role of white violence in maintaining racial 
hierarchies. That the Black Panthers were targeted so systematically by the state 
indicates that they were perceived to be a threat to the white power structure, which 
gives us insight into how challenging state terror is a revolutionary act in intellectual and 
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concrete ways. I show that the mainstream academic discourse on racism in American 
society assigns higher credibility to white philosophers even when Black thinkers have 
been producing relevant scholarship for centuries on the subject in question.  
 The third section examines the philosophy of the Enlightenment in terms of how 
it relates to the domestic colonization of African Americans and to the abuse of people 
of color around the globe by European and American imperialists. The purpose of this 
section is to show how scholars’ confidence in white canonized philosophers predisposes 
them to overlook Enlightenment philosophy’s structurally racist approach to political 
societies.  
 The fourth section provides a detailed overview of the key principles in Anti-
Colonial and Critical Race Theory as they intersect with Black Nationalism. Important 
issues addressed in this section include the role of prisons in keeping African Americans 
in a state of neo-slavery. In order to situate Black Nationalist thought within a broader 
intellectual history, I will discuss how Black Nationalism represents the culmination of 
radical American and Anti-Colonial political theory.  
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This thesis follows the style of The MLA Handbook. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For centuries, Black thinkers have offered theories on the political, economic, 
social and ideological causes and manifestations of racism. Whites’ historical response 
to this scholarship has been overwhelmingly one of ridicule or, more typically, total 
silence. This ignorance and lack of respect for Black social theorists persists despite 
ostensible improvements in academic and political inclusiveness for non-whites. 
However, the Black thinkers discussed in this thesis know from their political 
experiences in the United States that formal or token inclusion does not spell lasting 
progress or anything close to equality. My goal is to retrace this historical legacy of 
Black intellectuals’ challenges to the economic structures, political systems, and 
philosophies created by and for whites. Though this commentary was historically offered 
simultaneously with the emergence and development of whites’ new governments and 
ideas, they have largely been excluded from relevant academic discourses. The era of 
particular focus in this thesis is the historical moment in which Black Power movements 
received a dramatic increase in police and media attention during the 1960s and 1970s. I 
argue that Black Nationalism represents the culmination of Anti-Colonial philosophy in 
an American context, as this movement sought to use political philosophies based on 
historical knowledge of white supremacy in order to stop pursuing unsuccessful avenues 
for achieving liberation. Importantly, the Black Power activists seek to act on these 
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revolutionary ideas and argue that widespread understanding and acceptance of these 
concepts is an essential step in creating a more just society. 
Black Nationalism’s exclusion from mainstream academic discourse and 
curriculum is problematic because its absence leaves a gaping hole in our understanding 
of intellectual history. Additionally, it devalues theories based largely on their polemical 
stance toward the philosophical canon which was the source of white supremacist 
ideology. An exposition of the social conditions and historical legacies motivating Black 
Nationalists’ radical social theory presents an incredibly grim and violent portrait of the 
white race. The re-conceptualization of Euro-American culture as fundamentally 
colonial impeaches the authority of Western democratic ideology and presents white 
imperialism as one of the most violent, destructive movements in human history. Black 
Nationalists and other Anti-Colonialists examine the ethical implications of historical 
narratives that treat systematic European and American racist violence as an aberration 
from whites’ generally democratic and humanitarian behavior. They construct a 
genealogy of anti-Black racism by subjecting whiteness to analysis in terms of the 
violence and tyrannical structures that were necessary for its conception. 
It is important to clarify some things about Black Nationalism so that my use of 
this particular label will be properly understood in terms of its relation to other areas of 
Black thought and culture. This will require a synopsis of how this tradition finds its 
origin in both influential and forgotten predecessors. In the final section, I discuss in the 
American Black Nationalist movement as it is situated within the broader tradition of 
Anti-Colonialism, which has been subjecting white supremacy and Euro-American 
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imperialism to analysis for over a century. It is also important to note the diversity of 
opinions within the Black Nationalist movement, particularly concerning the role of 
women in the movement’s leadership. While this conversation on the internal struggles 
in Black Nationalism is a significant one, it is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, 
this should not undermine the project at hand, as these conflicts are secondary to the 
Anti-Colonialist thread which unites all Black Nationalists under a single philosophical 
movement. It is this Anti-Colonialist tradition that will guide my historical analyses on 
the slave trade and on the American penitentiary system. Finally, I will discuss Black 
Nationalism’s philosophical merits in terms of what it offers to the subsequent 
philosophical tradition of Critical Race Theory, specifically regarding its decisive 
influence on the more radical theories in Critical Race Theory like racial realism.  
Black Nationalists’ anti-colonial, historical critique is required if we are to 
uncover essential elements of white supremacy that would otherwise be overlooked in 
the white, liberal philosophical paradigm. In the second section, titled “Preventing the 
Rise of a Black Messiah: The Nefarious Partnership between Journalism, Philosophy, 
and the State,” I analyze an article written by Todd Fraley and Elli Lester-Roushanzamir 
that interprets the social implications of Black Panther leader Fred Hampton’s 
assassination through the lens of British sociology and Frankfurt School critical theory. 
My purpose is to show how this article exemplifies academia’s practice of assigning 
higher credibility to European philosophers when discussing racism, even if this means 
doing less rigorous scholarship. I argue that we should view this pattern of inquiry into 
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race relations as an essentially unethical methodology that serves to downplay the 
prevalence and political significance of systematic white-on-Black violence. 
An unapologetic interrogation of racism’s significance in Enlightenment thought 
allows us to understand the connections between slavery and the prison system. This will 
be the subject matter of the third section, titled “The Blinding Light of Modern Political 
Thought: How the Black Nationalist Perspective Unveils Ideological Commitments in 
Philosophical Scholarship.” By using a genealogical method to show how colonialism 
and the Enlightenment are intimately linked, Black Nationalists (and Critical Race 
theorists of close persuasions) are positing a novel theory. However, they are often 
disregarded for presenting a political theory that is extremely radical, particularly when 
it comes to Black Nationalists who are labeled as militant. However, it seems suspicious 
that Enlightenment philosophers’ racist intentions should suddenly become irrelevant 
when evaluating the areas where their political theories intersect with their racist 
ideology. The formal political structure set up by Enlightenment thinkers and the framers 
permanently opened the door to the brutal oppression of an entire race of people, and 
what ensued was foreseeable, openly acknowledged, and at the forefront of the decisive 
dialogue at that time. The simultaneity of the establishment of the institution of slavery 
and the forming of an American democratic nation during this period was no 
coincidence, just as it is no coincidence that Enlightenment philosophers addressed both 
of these issues in their political writings. The marriage of slavery and democracy in 
America was coined and blessed by the theoretical justifications these thinkers provided 
to support their coexistence in a single political system. A double standard is exposed 
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when race-conscious philosophers are accused of bringing race into the discussion when 
they simply seek to respond to what is already there, and thus are in a better position to 
accurately evaluate a philosopher’s work as a whole. 
In the fourth and final section titled “The Philosophical and Historical 
Foundations of Black Power,” I draw on major thinkers in the tradition whose works are 
representative of some of the field’s most important tenants. Angela Davis will be a 
central figure in this thesis for two primary reasons. First, her work on the connections 
between slavery and the prison system draws heavily on her predecessors W.E.B. 
DuBois and Frederick Douglass rather than on derivative Foucauldian theories which 
lack race consciousness. Secondly, her work provides insights which are made possible 
by her historical position within the Black Nationalist movement and its intellectual 
influence on her. She describes her “political awakening” as an intellectual turn and 
recalls the “impact of Malcolm X’s nationalist oratory…which [she] would later think of 
in terms similar to Frantz Fanon’s description of the coming to consciousness of the 
colonized in The Wretched of the Earth” (Davis Reader, 299). Her work on prisons and 
the philosophy of the Enlightenment will be discussed primarily in the third section. The 
final section is devoted to surveying other major thinkers in order to summarize central 
political theories and to show how they are at the root of the Black Power movement. 
Foucault’s silence on racism in Discipline and Punishment is analyzed excellently by 
Joy James, who presents a more accurate account of state violence by including the 
experiences of people of color who are attacked and colonized by imperialist Western 
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democracies. DuBois, Fanon, Cesaire, and thinkers in the Black Power movement are 
also discussed at length in the final section. 
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 2. PREVENTING THE RISE OF A BLACK MESSIAH: THE NEFARIOUS 
PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN JOURNALISM, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE STATE 
In 1969, the United States government escalated their ongoing war against the 
Black Panther Party for Self Defense, an organization that sought to end what the 
Panthers saw as whites’ colonial occupation and terrorism in the Black community. The 
Federal Government’s soldiers were armed, racist white men who were unleashed in an 
organized fashion on the BPP by the FBI’s Counterintelligence Program,1 whose 
coordinated police attacks targeted leaders and members of the Black Panther Party 
(BPP). 2 During this particularly bloody year, “twenty-seven Panthers were killed by 
local police and law-enforcement agencies and 749 members were arrested” (Marable 
and Mullings, 456). Despite the current availability of internal documents in which the 
government openly admits to its oppressive and violent objectives, propaganda in the 
news media was largely successful in influencing the general public’s and academics’ 
stance toward Black Nationalists’ political thought.    
A common caricature of the Black Nationalists disseminated by the media at this 
time presents the BPP as the aggressors rather than as the victims of unwarranted and 
unprovoked violence. As philosophers we must live up to our profession by challenging 
these dangerous and persistent assumptions. Thinking critically about the historical 
context in which this myth of BPP aggression originated is crucial when evaluating the 
                                                
1 Also known as COINTELPRO. 
2 Hereafter ‘BPP.’ 
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accuracy of these claims. This undertaking is essential if we are to appreciate that the 
Black Nationalist philosophy emerging from these social conditions offers an important 
contribution to academic political discourse. The most difficult step in this process for 
whites is to face the important role of violence and the press in maintaining white 
supremacist political structures that have been overlooked in the white liberal 
philosophical paradigm. Acknowledging the role of violence and the press in 
maintaining white supremacist political structures requires the white liberal 
philosophical establishment to look honestly at themselves in a new (and unflattering) 
light. This honesty also consequently forces philosophers to acknowledge that even the 
most radical continental traditions cannot be self-policing when it comes to their role in 
the cover-up of the political function of white violence.  
The first section of this section will tell the story of the death Black Panther 
leader Fred Hampton, who was murdered by the Chicago police on the orders of the 
FBI’s Counterintelligence Program. This account of Hampton’s murder will set the stage 
for my evaluation of an article by Todd Fraley and Elli Lester-Roushanzamir on the 
media coverage of Hampton’s assassination. This piece by Fraley and Lester-
Roushanzamir will be at the forefront of my inquiry, as it exemplifies the unwillingness 
of scholars to consult Black thinkers even when their work is far more relevant to an 
analysis of white violence. I argue that we should view this pattern of inquiry into race 
relations as an essentially unethical methodology that serves to downplay the prevalence 
and political significance of systematic white-on-Black violence.  
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In the second section, I refer to work done by Brady Heiner in order to situate 
Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir’s article within the broader context of philosophical 
scholarship on race and to establish a pattern in academia’s treatment of Black 
Nationalist literature. In his article “Foucault and the Black Panthers,” Heiner examines 
how the Black Panthers remain largely unrecognized as the source of the ideas that 
Foucault appropriated in several of his canonized philosophical works. I will apply 
Heiner’s theories on the ethical and epistemological ramifications of such trends in 
scholarship in order to illustrate the problematic relationship between continental 
philosophy and Black Nationalist literature. This is exemplified in Fraley and Lester-
Roushanzamir’s use of Althusser’s concept of the ideological state apparatus to explain 
whites’ uncritical response to police violence against the Black community. I refer to 
articles published by the Black Panther Party in order to demonstrate that the members 
of the Black community understood the complexities of their relationship to the general 
public, thus rendering the Frankfurt School’s concepts of ideology and British Cultural 
Studies’ theory of deviance obsolete and inaccurate.3  
In his book, Destructive Impulses: An Examination of an American Secret in 
Race Relations: White Violence, A. J. Williams-Myers provides a literature review of 
academic works which attempt to address the centuries-old problem of white violence 
against African Americans. He argues that this literature is representative of most 
academic work on this subject in that they fail get to the heart of the subject matter either 
                                                
3 I chose to focus on Hampton due to his leadership role in the Black Panthers, his enormous 
publicity in the Black community, and because the state singled him out specifically as a target 
for assassination.  
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by ignoring the prevalence and political function of white violence or by positioning this 
violence within a broader and more abstract discussion of societal violence in general. 
Williams-Myers contends that “until such time as social scientists are willing to face up 
to the importance of white violence as an integral variable in any discourse on race 
relations, windows of opportunity for elevating the discourse are impossible” (Williams-
Myers, 6). In the third section, I go one step further by arguing that this failure in 
mainstream race scholarship is intimately connected to academics’ general refusal to cite 
Black thinkers who are willing to analyze whites’ collective culpability in this history. I 
argue that Black Panther philosophy is excluded from Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir’s 
article because such engagement would require them to examine how the constant threat 
white-on-Black violence defined the meaning and reception of Hampton’s revolutionary 
theories.  
The insights offered by the Panthers’ social and political philosophies addressing 
the systematic occurance and necessity of white violence against Blacks is analyzed in 
the last section of this section and offers what I take to be a renewed rigor in the 
philosophy of race and racism. In short, this section seeks to contribute to the elevation 
of the discourse on race by addressing the systematic nature of police brutality and the 
Black Panthers’ revolutionary, journalistic response. Todd Fraley and Elli Lester-
Roushanzamir’s article is of particular focus in this piece because it is a prime example 
of the extent to which scholars are willing to ignore even the most obvious windows of 
opportunity for discussing the philosophical import of white violence, preferring instead 
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to elevate Eurocentric analyses of power.4 Their unwillingness to consult Black 
Nationalist literature in an article purporting to examine the assassination of one of their 
most promising leaders points to a broader pattern in which “most traditional, white 
social scientists are incapable of viewing white violence holistically” (6). While 
Williams-Myers’s book provides an excellent historical account of white violence, Black 
philosophers for centuries have been arguing for the central importance of white 
violence in American race relations and were the first to use the historical genealogical 
method to expose the political function of this violence in its many diverse forms.   
2.1 CRITICAL THEORY AND DEVIANCE: A WHITE-WASHED APPROACH TO 
WHITE SUPREMACY 
On the early morning of December 4, 1969, Chicago police raided an apartment 
where Black Panther members were residing. During this raid, police killed Black 
Panthers Fred Hampton and Mark Clark. Hampton was killed by two gunshot wounds to 
the head while still asleep in his bed. The police were able to quickly identify Hampton’s 
bedroom using a detailed floor plan of the apartment that they received from Hampton’s 
bodyguard, an FBI informant (Blackstock, 24). This raid was orchestrated by the FBI’s 
Counterintelligence Program, which sought to infiltrate radical political organizations 
and sabotage their efforts.  Particularly threatened by Hampton’s push for armed self-
defense in the Black community, J. Edgar Hoover called on COINTELPRO officials to 
“pinpoint potential troublemakers and neutralize them before they exercise their 
                                                
4 Postmodernists and white feminists who call themselves critical race theorists have splintered 
the field between discourse analysts and racial realists such as Derrick Bell. Cf. Curry, “Will the 
Real CRT Please Stand Up?”  
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potential for violence” (22). These documents which are now available to the public 
demonstrate that Hampton’s assassination was not an isolated incident, as they establish 
a link between police brutality and the State’s coordinated, systemic and calculated use 
of the legal system to further Black subordination. The content of these and other memos 
provide evidence for the Black Panthers’ interpretations of the meaning of these events, 
which will be fleshed out in more detail in the final section. 
However, a problematic trend exists in academia in which continental 
philosophers’ theories are favored as a means for explaining the oppression of African 
Americans. In “Revolutionary Leader or Deviant Thug? A Comparative Analysis of the 
Chicago Tribune and Chicago Daily Defender’s Reporting on the Death of Fred 
Hampton,” Todd Fraley and Elli Lester-Roushanzamir discuss the press coverage of 
Hampton’s assassination and interpret the differences between the “general” press’s and 
the Black press’s presentation of the facts. They argue that these differences can be 
explained by applying the Frankfurt School critical theorist Louis Althusser’s concept of 
an ideological state apparatus to the mainstream Chicago press. In addition, they appeal 
to the concept of “moral panic” produced by British Cultural Studies in order to explain 
the general public’s hostility toward the BPP. Their article ultimately seeks to use Fred 
Hampton’s assassination as a means for explaining how and why “the discourse of 
journalism[,] professional values and norms suppress or obscure minority voices” (147). 
Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir make it clear that their primary objective is not 
to develop an explanation of the press coverage of Fred Hampton's assassination based 
on the general media's racist motivations, but to supplement a pre-existing theory that is 
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does not address anti-Black racism. They do this by arguing that European philosophy 
and social science can provide an accurate framework with which to evaluate the Black 
Panthers' relationship with the police force and the general press. In conjunction with 
Althusser’s concept of how ideological state apparatuses are effective at “containing 
social challenge and change,” they believe that the events surrounding Hampton’s 
assassination can be explained using Stanley Cohen’s theory how perceptions of 
deviance “marginalized dissent.” According to Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir, the 
press induced a state of “moral panic” amongst the general public by portraying the 
Black Panthers as deviating from traditional American values. In their application of the 
concept of moral panic to the Tribune’s biased press coverage of Hampton’s 
assassination, Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir write that through this process of 
distortion, “deviants become a serious threat to social values and morality; and as 
hostility and concern increases, the response to such threats is in the demand for greater 
regulation and a ‘return to traditional values’ (Thompson, 1998, p. 9)”(153). 
The concept of moral panic was developed by Cohen in 1964 and 1965 and was 
based on his studies of how deviance in British youth was portrayed and understood by 
“the media, the public, and agents of social control” as “‘a threat to societal values and 
interests’”(152).  Because whites were the ones labeled as deviant by the press in 
Cohen’s study, Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir are suggesting that whites and Blacks 
can be oppressed in the same way through this common mechanism of dominance (in 
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this case, slanderous accusations of deviance). Due to their racial illiteracy,5 however, 
British Cultural Studies’ theory of “moral panic” is inapplicable to the events 
surrounding the media’s tolerance of police brutality against Blacks. By trying to apply 
Cohen’s theory of deviance based on studies that concerned white, non-American 
subjects to the BPP in the context of the civil rights era, Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir 
are assuming that these findings are applicable to all groups regardless of the deep 
racism that was (and continues to be) the primary defining factor in the conflict between 
the Black community and the police state. By using concepts that have no direct link to 
the relationship between Blacks and the police state to explain this event, Fraley and 
Lester-Roushanzamir are able to manipulate the issue to make it seem as though it need 
not necessarily apply to Black Americans, yet is still capable of explaining the public’s 
support for their murder and mass incarceration. 
Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir evaluate the stark contrast between the coverage 
of Hampton’s assassination by the Chicago Defender and the Chicago Tribune. The 
morning after Fred Hampton’s murder, 
the Chicago Tribune (Tribune) ran a front-page picture consisting of rows 
of guns, bullets, and boxes of ammunition. The caption read, ‘part of a 
weapons cache seized after raid on west side apartment used as secret 
headquarters of the Black Panther Party…’ (150). 
By presenting the story in this way Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir write that the 
general press both “trivialized” the BPP and fueled episodes of moral panic which 
                                                
5 The term “racial literacy” comes from Guinier. 
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“established the Panthers as the deviant other while supporting law enforcement officials 
and their tactics” (158). Framing moral panic as essentially unconscious racism, Fraley 
and Lester-Roushanzamir support Lule’s theory that “as proponents of social order, the 
news media ‘can hardly be expected to seek out subtleties about black men with guns’” 
(Lule 288, Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir, 152).  
In contrast, they claim that the “Defender used a more inclusive approach that 
resisted the commonsense view of the Tribune and articulated challenges to the existing 
journalism paradigm” (164). However, arguing that the Tribune was reluctant to 
challenge the journalistic paradigm sanitizes the discourse on race by failing to explicitly 
identify whites as the perpetrators. The suggestion that the white public’s and 
mainstream press’s support of “society’s existing power structure” (rather than “racial 
hierarchy”) was in any way coerced suggests that the general population and the 
Tribune’s journalists had a sense of powerlessness over the situation and failed to 
imagine that the situation could change. Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir frame the issue 
as an opportunity to use postmodern philosophy to question the nature of objectivity, 
exposing the Tribune as a “regulatory apparatus” (164). Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir 
contend that their “analysis of the Defender illustrates that competing press outlets using 
similar professional journalistic practices and routines can arrive at quite different 
outcomes” (164). By framing the problem in this way, Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir 
neglect the problem of violence and pardon the Tribune’s journalists of any willful 
wrongdoing. In actuality, every white journalist covering Hampton’s assassination had a 
material interest in maintaining a white-supremacist racial hierarchy. If we view the 
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journalists’ motivations in terms of white supremacy and white privilege, it becomes 
more difficult to argue that an abstract and external force (ideological state apparatuses) 
decisively conditioned their interpretations. However, because Fraley and Lester chose 
to use Althusserian principles of structural causality, they can argue that “[t]he press, 
using professional journalistic discourses of objectivity and impartiality, is able to 
exercise this hegemonic role,” yet are still “operating with complete integrity, [as they] 
are able to convince themselves that they choose and interpret the news objectively” 
(152).  
Because Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir’s article is based on a postmodern 
discourse analysis, the primary focus is on who gets to define and interpret rather than 
who has the power to assassinate leaders and commit violence against Black citizens 
with immunity. Their article reflects the unwillingness of white philosophers writing on 
race to engage the subject of racial violence as an issue of philosophical import. Rather 
than citing thinkers in the Black Panther movement, Black sociologists,6 or Black 
philosophers, Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir choose to participate in the prevalent 
tendency of white scholars to explain Blacks’ experiences of oppression by using white 
philosophers’ theories rather than referring to how Black thinkers conceptualize their 
own experiences. 
  
                                                
6 Speaking to social research done on Black families, Joseph White writes in The Psychology of 
Blacks that Euro-American norms have been used as the standard by which to judge Black 
families as deviant and argue for the “inappropriateness of such comparisons by suggesting that 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand the life styles of Black people using traditional 
theories developed by Whites to explain Whites” (White and Parham, 27). 
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2.2 THERE IS NOTHING SUBTLE ABOUT BLACK MEN WITH GUNS: THE 
SELF-DEFENSE PLATFORM OF THE BPP 
The BPP was formed with the immediate objective of protecting the Black 
community from police violence, which was why they were originally named “The 
Black Panther Party for Self-Defense.” The Black Panthers encouraged the community 
to exercise their Second Amendment rights and made it the aim of the party to provide 
“the autonomous defense of the black community against the experienced threat of 
police brutality and other forms of State violence.” Paul Robeson points out that the 
demands of Black Americans are consistent not only with morality but also “have been 
and remain consistent with the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution” (449). The Black Panthers saw the police state as the 
primary producer and enforcer of the State’s racist, imperialist ideology and argued that 
the prison system served as a replacement for the institution of slavery. Often writing 
behind bars, Davis and Jackson “created a vocabulary for understanding the reciprocal 
social process by which radical political activism was criminalized and crime 
politicized” (Heiner, 319). 
Most threatening to the state was the Panthers' potential to undermine the method 
of domination that whites have used against Blacks ever since they were brought to 
America in chains—violence. White supremacist ideology that portrays Blacks as a 
threat to white privilege and culture has for centuries been used to justify public 
lynching and police violence against African Americans. Justifications for this terrorist 
behavior have often appeared in the press in more overt ways, and the increase in 
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subtlety over time in the delivery of this message does not support the suggestion that 
whites are less aware of their hostility toward Blacks. The general public does not 
simply stand by and tolerate the actions of the police state, but actively participates. 
Built into the supposedly democratic American state are “accommodating structures”7 
that allow for racial violence and mob rule. In other words, the legal system in America 
was designed to allow for certain kinds of lawlessness (by the police and the general 
public) which are in turn pardoned by the press. 
Among the few “traditional American values” that are protected through 
systematic violence, most relevant here is the concept of the “cultural community of 
whiteness,” which each white person has the legal right to protect through violence.8 The 
central objective behind this community’s violent practices (as well as the construction 
of the American government around the justification of the “peculiar institution” of 
“racial slavery”) was to make all people of African descent “stand in fear.” This tactic of 
social control was an on-going process, and it allowed racialized slavery to come into 
being. In his discussion of segregation, Williams-Myers explains the important concept 
of “two worlds revolving on a single axis: one of whiteness politically and economically 
responsive to the dictates of white supremacy, and that of the ‘black beast rapist’ 
spinning tenuously and unstable, and dependent, in more ways than one, on the white 
world’” (51).  
                                                
7 This term comes from Williams-Myers. 
8 Again, these are Williams-Myers’ terms. 
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Three decades before Williams-Myers’s book was published, the Black Panther 
community as being separate from the white community, subject to violence and lacking 
protection and rights granted to whites. As Heiner points out in his exposition of BPP 
literature, “One of the central features of the philosophies of the Black Panther Party was 
the view that the black population within the USA constituted an internal, racialized 
colony—one constantly threatened, impoverished and criminalized by the occupying 
forces of American governmental authority” (Heiner, 322).  Thus, at the heart of Black 
Nationalist philosophy is the expectation that the power differential between Blacks and 
whites in America be understood in terms of this domestic colonization.9 As Eldridge 
Cleaver writes, “‘Black people are a stolen people held in a colonial status on stolen 
land, and any analysis which does not acknowledge the colonial status of black people 
cannot hope to deal with the real problem’” (323).  
The conflict between Black Nationalists and the police should not be understood 
in terms of the state’s efforts to control deviance, but rather as a battle between 
colonizers and the colonized. Angela Y. Davis, George Jackson, and other Black Panther 
writers explain that the BPP “effectively declared war on the USA by declaring rights; or 
rather, by declaring rights, the BPP rendered explicit the ongoing, undeclared war being 
waged against black people in and by the USA” (323). Their analysis of state oppression 
exposes the political function served by prisons and police brutality. Importantly, their 
writings delineate the specific and concrete ways in which their oppression relates to the 
                                                
9 The concept of domestic colonization is explained and put in its historical context relative to 
work by other Black social theorists in Robert Allen’s, The Black Awakening in Capitalist 
America. 
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oppression of other groups. Their work offers a genealogy of the police state and 
explains how its existence and meaning cannot be disentangled from the global tyranny 
of white imperialism and, more locally, the internal colony of the Black community. The 
imprisonment and assassination of Black leaders in particular cannot be understood 
outside of this framework, and COINTELPRO memos from the time which declare 
several of the state’s motivations provide evidence for their analyses.     
In her article supporting the armed self-defense platform of the BPP, party 
member Elise (no last name given) describes an event in which she and Regina Burruss, 
another female party member who was 5 months pregnant, were severely beaten and 
arrested by the police while they were simply trying to hang up posters for the BPP's 
Free Breakfast Program (“Fascist Tactics”). The Black Liberation Alliance's national 
director Robert L. Lucas argues that Hampton posed a “threat to Mayor Richard J. 
Daley's political machine in the ghetto wards,” as “Hampton's organization of the 
breakfasts for children program…had been feeding some 3,000 children throughout the 
city” (“Black Alliance”). COINTELPRO memos that have now been released provide 
support for this interpretation. Hoover writes in a COINTELPRO memo on “Black 
Nationalist hate-groups” that “[s]pecific tactics to prevent these groups from converting 
young people must be developed.” (Blackstock, 23). Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir’s 
article (particularly its appeal to “moral panic”) cannot provide any satisfactory 
explanation for how feeding impoverished children could be perceived by the general 
public as a threat to “traditional values.” Clearly there is another motivating factor at the 
root of this pattern of white-on-Black terrorism that is being overlooked in their analysis.  
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A COINTELPRO memo written by J. Edgar Hoover on March 4, 1968—one 
month before the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.—calls on members of the 
program to “[p]revent the rise of a ‘messiah’ who could unify, and electrify, the militant 
black nationalist movement” (22). Hoover identifies Malcom X as a primary target of 
their preventative tactics, and Noam Chomsky writes that “[o]ther Cointelpro files show 
that the FBI also had infiltrators operating within Malcom’s Muslim Mosque, Inc.”(22-
3). It is also important to note that Hoover calls King “a real contender for this position 
should he abandon his supposed ‘obedience’ to ‘white, liberal doctrines’ (nonviolence) 
and embrace black nationalism” (22). Here Hoover is explicitly identifying nonviolence 
as the traditional value that serves the interests of the state and whites in general at the 
expense of Black Nationalist groups. During Hampton’s trial for theft in the spring of 
1969, the state’s attorney Robert McGee questioned Hampton on his support for armed 
revolution. When pressed as to whether this kind of violence was justified, Hampton 
responded: “I believe if we tried anything else we would end up like Dr. Martin Luther 
King” (“Why Judge”). One clear way in which Black Nationalist ideology is a threat to 
American values is through its revolutionary objectives that reject the liberal creed of 
gradual reform and the accompanying assimilationist ideology promoted by the Tribune. 
George Jackson writes that “[t]here can be no rigid time controls attached to ‘the 
process’ that offers itself as relief, not if those for whom it is principally intended are 
under attack now” (Blood, 10). 
While it is easy to single out revolutionaries like the Black Panthers as a threat to 
American values, it is crucial to explain that this revolutionary movement was provoked 
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by the fact that Blackness in itself has historically been treated as a threat to whites’ 
values (which are based on their belief in the superiority of the white race). African 
Americans who refrain from any political activity or who even assist the American 
government in its publically supported war efforts are still subject to mob violence. In 
chapter 8 of his book on white violence, “Johnny’s March Home: A Violent Reception 
in the Inter-War Years,” Williams-Myers continues his cataloguing of mob lynching and 
large, genocidal riots such as the East St. Louis Riot in July of 1917. According to one 
estimate, 500 Black men, women, and children were brutally murdered by the non-elite 
whites who have a historically open partnership with the police state. Police officers 
either refused to protect Blacks or aided in the white mob’s acts of lynching and 
genocidal riots. The East St. Louis Riot was acted out in a similar fashion multiple times 
all over the nation following the First World War.  
Williams-Myers works to educate the reader on these issues in order to reveal the 
hidden secret of white violence in this suppressed history and to explain how the 
treatment of returning Black soldiers after World War I contributes to an understanding 
of white supremacy. These brave, award-winning soldiers “continued their assault on the 
accommodative structure of the ‘cultural communion of whiteness’ as they sought the 
‘American Dream’” (69). Williams-Myers writes, 
In spite of the fact that the Black soldier put his life on the line for white 
Europe, he found within the cultural community of whiteness in his own 
country that his life had little value. At any time it could be snuffed out 
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by sublimated destructive impulses poised precariously at the fringes of 
the white psyche (63).  
Williams-Myers cites W.E.B. DuBois’s reports of the number of lynchings he was able 
to record during his time in college, when “1700 Blacks were lynched in America in an 
atmosphere of lawlessness, and in a country that was supposedly governed by laws.” 
(56). Like Hampton, BPP journalists regularly referred to police officers as “pigs,” 
defining “pig” as “an individual [who] carries himself in a manner that shows no respect 
for life, or liberty, no regard for property, and all the while hiding behind the ‘Tin Badge 
of Law and Order.’” (BPP leaders and the multitude of BPP journalists repeatedly 
denied the charge of harboring blind prejudice against all whites, stating simply that 
“[w]e as human beings judge other people by their social practices” (“Racist Pigs”)). In 
order to develop and explain those judgments, BPP journalists took it upon themselves 
to document whites’ most brutal social practices when mainstream (white-dominated) 
newspapers distorted the facts or ignored cases of police brutality altogether.  
Black Panthers do not deny that the press plays a significant role in suppressing 
dissent. However, discourse analysts frequently fall short when explaining how the 
public is manipulated through the press by failing to notice that the difference between 
verbal and physical oppression is divided along the color line. In the COINTELPRO 
“Black messiah” memo, Hoover says the program must “[p]revent militant black 
nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability¸ by discrediting them to three 
separate segments of the community.” The ideological tactics discussed by Fraley and 
Lester for example only apply to the first two audiences identified by Hoover following 
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this statement. These groups are whites and “responsible” African Americans, who may 
be sympathetic to the Black Panthers but hold on to “liberal” (nonviolent) values. 
Discrediting the Black Panthers to the third segment Hoover identifies—Black 
radicals—“requires entirely different tactics from the first two.” Hoover reminds 
COINTELPRO officers that “[p]ublicity about violent tendencies and radical statements 
merely enhances black nationalists to the last group; it adds ‘respectability’ in a different 
way.” COINTELPRO’s chosen method of undermining the Black community’s 
confidence in the Black Panthers was to assassinate its most promising leaders. Because 
the Black community’s newspapers didn’t buy into the ideology promoted by the 
“mainstream” press, the state decided to use violence to accomplish this goal. Like 
others in the field, Fraley and Lester grossly overestimate the extent to which “discursive 
strategies…help[ed] diminish the need for repressive actions”(148).  
As scholars like Heiner and Tommy Curry show, this problem in the field of 
philosophy has had a profoundly negative effect on race scholarship. In his article “Shut 
Your Mouth When You’re Talking to Me: Silencing the Idealist School of Critical Race 
Theory through a Culturalogical Turn in Jurisprudence,” Curry calls on scholars 
speaking on racial oppression to resist the field’s privileging of Eurocentric concepts and 
philosophical traditions such as postmodernism to explain Blacks’ subjugation under 
white supremacy. Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir’s article provides a clear incentive to 
resist Eurocentric scholars’ tendency to de-radicalize critical race studies by using white-
dominated postmodern frameworks to analyze white-on-Black oppression. Both 
educators and scholars are prone to “ignor[ing] the role that white privilege and the 
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social reification of individual white identities played in maintaining white supremacy 
when speaking about and analogizing race.” As Curry points out, philosophy in 
particular is plagued by “whites’ anthropologically specific ideas of reason and 
humanity” and, when addressing white-on-Black racism, “philosophy is suddenly 
limited—incarcerated by the white imagination’s inability to confront its corporal 
reflection” (Curry “Saved by the Bell”, 36). The participation of critical theory scholars 
who are not primarily focused on race has opened the door to postmodernism and 
discourse analysis in what should have been an unapologetic conversation about white 
supremacists’ colonization of African-descended people.  
Pointing to the theoretical conflict between postmodern philosophy and Black 
Nationalism, Heiner examines why “the insurgent knowledges of black power 
movements remain largely unassimilable to these [postmodern] regimes of knowledge” 
(315). Black Nationalist philosophy interprets society’s relation to history in a manner 
that impeaches (even liberal) whites’ inaction as a form of consent to the American 
white racial hierarchy. Criticizing idealists who fail to evaluate the concrete, material 
issues at hand in systematic racism, Richard Delgado emphasizes the idea that “[m]uch 
more than text, narrative, and mindset governs the course of race relations” 
(“Crossroads”, 144). Curry argues for this point in his writings on the risks involved in 
depending on discourse analysts who argue that critical race theorists can draw lessons 
from thinkers like Foucault (“Please Don’t Make Me”). Because white postmodernists 
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have appropriated and analogized their way into CRT,10 race-crits now have to struggle 
against whites’ attempts to control the terms of the discourse. In particular, there is a 
need to resist efforts to silence the discourse on whites’ violence. A key method of doing 
this is to focus on abstract concepts such as (generally postmodern) theories of 
“disciplinary power, biopower and governmentality,” at least partially because “the 
discourse and commitments of black power magnetize bullets; Malcolm X, Bobby 
Hutton, Alprentice ‘Bunchy’ Carter, Fred Hampton, Mark Clark, Brenda Harris, 
Jonathan Jackson, James McClain, William Christmas, George Jackson and many others 
have been killed precisely for having deployed them” (Heiner, 344). Fraley and Lester-
Roushanzamir reflect the preference in academia for appealing to canonized figures in 
continental philosophy, choosing to interpret the party's relationship to society without 
analyzing the party's literature and to evaluate whites' perceived threat in terms of their 
concern for traditional values. 
The Panthers’ conception of power was derived from personal experience and 
was not inspired by postmodern thinkers such as Foucault or Althusser. In order to 
explain their current predicament in American society, Black Panthers employed a 
genealogical methodology that analyzed prisons and other oppressive systems by tracing 
their origin to their first contact with white colonizers. Pointing to the shift in 
“Foucault’s method and domain of critique” in the 1970s, Heiner criticizes the lack of 
scholarly attention given to the Black Panthers’ demonstrable role in inspiring “Foucault 
                                                
10 For more information on the harmful effects of equating racism with other forms of oppression 
affecting white people, see Grillo and Wildman. 
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the political theorist of power relations and techniques of domination” (313). By 
documenting Foucault’s interactions with Black Nationalists, Heiner shows that 
Foucault’s political, genealogical, and prison-oriented method emerges following his 
exposure to the Black Panthers’ particular political approach to analyzing power 
dynamics.  
In one of his speeches, Hampton emphasized a crucial principle in Black Panther 
philosophy on violence and power: “We are going to defend ourselves because Huey P. 
Newton said that...power is the ability to define phenomena and make it act in a desired 
manner” (The Murder). In America, the prison system has the power to use violence 
with impunity and is supported by the media’s racist portrayals of the victims of this 
violence. Heiner writes that Black Nationalists Angela Davis and George Jackson were 
key figures in “the international prison abolition movement of the 1970s,” and that “the 
events of revolutionary anti-racist struggle in the USA were the primary inspiration for 
Foucault’s genealogical reorientation” (332). While the transition in Foucault’s work 
from epistemological archaeology to the politicized genealogical method has been 
heavily examined in academia, prior to Heiner’s piece, the Black Panthers’ influence 
received no scholarly attention. This is in part because Foucault’s style of engagement 
with Black philosophy was one of erasure, particularly so when white philosophers study 
Foucault without problematizing the omission of African Americans’ unique historical 
relationship with the prison system.  
Black Nationalists have also responded to Foucault’s work on prisons and 
punishment in terms of the part that this philosophy plays in erasing state violence. Joy 
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James’s book Resisting State Violence cites and analyzes patterns of state terror 
domestically and in terms of America’s violent, imperialist foreign policy. In this work, 
James criticizes what she calls “Foucauldean erasures” rampant in Discipline and 
Punishment that support “false notions of body politics and repression” (42).  She argues 
that there is significant oversight of racism and violent punishment in his discussion of 
prisons’ oppressive political and social functions. James’s writings show how political 
treatises that argue for the necessity of revolutionary thought and action do not entail 
disengagement with European philosophy.11 Like other Black Nationalists, her work 
does exhibit an a-typical style of engagement with mainstream discourse on traditional 
Western philosophy in that it subjects whites to analysis as a cohesive racial group. 
(African Americans were not oppressed as individuals, but were defined and mistreated 
according to a racial hierarchy in which whites were favored above all others.12) 
Foucault fails to do this, choosing instead to downplay the presence of state violence and 
torture while ignoring the significance of race in the state’s efforts to control some 
populations differently than others based on their physical appearance. In doing so, 
Foucault participates in the propagandistic erasure of white violence. 
In the next section, I will continue this discussion on racist propaganda in white 
philosophy by examining the ways in which the celebrated ideals of the enlightenment 
that increase intellectual vulnerability to deceptive egalitarian rhetoric. The 
philosophical project at hand for Black Nationalists is to challenge assumptions about 
                                                
11 Ture and Hamilton argue, however, that whites and blacks cannot form coalitions given the 
present power differential and conflicting interests.  
12 Cf. Ture and Hamilton 
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the necessity and function of the prison system. They argue that it serves to maintain a 
colonial relationship between whites and Blacks by justifying their abuse and 
imprisonment, and the mainstream media is a partner in this colonial enterprise. In the 
U.S., the accommodating structure of the prison system allowed whites to maintain their 
previous violence, exploitation and wide-ranging oppression of African Americans by 
adapting their previous tactics to create a smooth transition to “neoslavery.” (This 
concept will be compared with “neo-colonialism” in the fourth section.) The federal 
government’s anti-slavery rhetoric and Lincoln’s famous initiative in passing the second 
version of the Thirteenth Amendment creates the impression that benevolent whites 
meant to bestow on African Americans something greater than “nominal sovereignty.” 
African Americans were kept in a state of neoslavery through the “Black Codes enacted 
at the end of the Civil War [which] resembled those of the Slave Codes” (Royster, 6). 
This is a decisive historical moment in Black Nationalism’s genealogy of the prison 
system. In section 3, I explain how Davis’s genealogy of the prison system traced the 
emergence of surging Black prison population to the historical moment in which one’s 
right to be free from confinement and forced labor was inalienable except in the case of 
imprisonment.   
The media and the state viewed the Black Panthers not simply as “deviant” but as 
restless colonial subjects. Black Nationalists argue that propaganda in the media and the 
police violence that it justifies or minimizes are meant to keep African Americans in a 
state of near slavery as a domestically colonized people. Jackson’s theory of 
“neoslavery” uses the same genealogical method of investigation as that in Anti-
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Colonialism (discussed in detail in the final section). This method places whites’ 
egalitarian claims alongside their relevant actions and demonstrates how whites use 
rhetoric to distort or conceal violence. In addition to the media’s unfair treatment of 
imprisoned African Americans as dangerous to society, the prison system itself is 
designed to make it extremely difficult for the public to scrutinize its actions. According 
to Davis, the prison serves an ideological function by “reliev[ing] us of the responsibility 
of seriously engaging with the problems of our society, especially those produced by 
racism and, increasingly, global capitalism” (Are Prisons Obsolete?, 16). The media 
assists in this erasure of police violence through their portrayals of African Americans as 
a danger to society. Whites’ fear, however, is for their privilege and not for their safety 
as Myers demonstrates in his historical account of mob violence.   
Propaganda in the media functions through erasure and through distortions of the 
state’s as well as the public’s motivations for racial violence. Following the formal 
abolition of slavery, Ida B. Wells documented the surge of lynchings and proposed 
theories that countered the white media’s explanation of what was motivating the brutal 
murders of thousands of African Americans. Like the BPP, Wells and her constituents 
produced their own publications in which to expose and analyze whites’ violence when 
the mainstream media refused to do so. Through her systematic investigation of 
lynching, Wells found that the overwhelming majority of those targeted were not the 
victims of an overzealous mob seeking to implement vigilante justice for the rape of 
white women. Rather, Wells found that widespread lynching was meant to keep Black 
people in a state of fear so that whites could maintain a privileged position in society 
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akin to their status prior to the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. Wells found that 
whites’ violence against Blacks was also out of fear of racial mixture. In one case, a 
Black man named Daniel Edwards in Alabama was lynched by a mob when he was 
arrested for having a consensual relationship with a white woman which resulted in the 
birth of a child of mixed race (125).  Wells was personally acquainted with the victims of 
another lynching which was meant solely to intimidate Blacks from creating profitable 
business that competed with whites’.13   
Following this theoretical legacy, Davis writes in “Rape, Racism and the Myth of 
the Black Rapist” that “Frederick Douglass’ explanation of the political motives 
underlying the creation of the mythical Black rapist is a brilliant analysis of the way 
ideology transforms to meet new historical conditions” (186). Employing a similar 
genealogical method, Davis takes a radical turn in the standard discourse on gender roles 
by tracing them not just to white-male patriarchy, but to white supremacist colonialism 
itself. Philosophy participates in the erasure of colonial history by focusing on analyses 
of gender and sexuality that lack race-consciousness and thus cannot begin to explain 
how sexism relates directly to white supremacy in a direct (rather than analogous) sense. 
The emergence of “intersectionality” favored by feminists in academia as a method of 
understanding how racism and sexism work together fails to benefit from this work and 
often does a poor job at reinventing the wheel. As Greg Thomas points out, not only was 
Toni Cade discussing these issues “long before the issue of social construction became 
                                                
13 Three of Wells’s friends were murdered by a lynch mob as punishment for trying to defend 
their lives and their property by returning fire with fire. (Royster, 2) 
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prominent in Western academia,” but she provided a basis for rejecting the Eurocentric, 
a-historical method of interrogating gender and sexuality. White women participate 
directly in the brutal oppression of Black men and women, and philosophical systems 
which treat white women as strictly victims of patriarchy contribute to the erasure of 
colonial violence. While some philosophers writing on gender do engage colonialism,14 
thinkers in Davis’s tradition actually address the domestic colonization of Black people.    
2.3 CONCLUSION 
The employment of theories constructed by postmodernists and white, European 
sociologists allows Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir to identify the general press as 
“proponents of the social order” without implicating its journalists or subjecting the 
police state to the same level of analysis (Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir, 153). 
Moreover, their use of Althusser’s interpretive framework to explain the ideological 
power-struggles at work in the press reflects a decision to participate in academia's 
practice of assigning higher credibility to European philosophers when talking about 
race, even if this means doing less rigorous scholarship. Heiner comes to the conclusion 
“that Foucault takes the so-called ‘counter-historical’ discourses of Boulainvilliers and 
Thierry to be more credible than those of Cleaver, Davis, Jackson, Newton, Seale, etc.—
or, at the very least, that he takes them to be more appropriate or legitimate types of 
knowledge for discussion in lectures and writings published in such widely circulating, 
‘truth-bearing’ institutions like the College de France and major academic presses” 
                                                
14 Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak specifically addresses gender issues in a colonial context in her 
piece, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”  
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(Heiner, 345). In the next section, I will discuss what the Black Panthers were saying 
about themselves in their newspapers and will show how epistemic injustice was fought 
head-on through their journalism and political writings.   
Heiner uses the concept of “epistemic injustice” to identify “the erasure of and 
silence about the link between Foucault and the Black Panthers” (344). This kind of 
erasure also takes place when no Black Panther literature is referenced even when the 
assassination, imprisonment, and public slandering of their leaders is the issue under 
discussion. Like Heiner, we must question the political and ethical implications of 
scholarship that commits a form of epistemic injustice in the authors’ willingness to 
write on race and power-structures without taking on white supremacy, especially when 
extensive literature is available on the subject. BPP members such as George Jackson 
wrote several books on the political significance of white terrorism, arguing that 
“[p]olitics and war are inseparable in a fascist state” (Jackson, “On Discipline”). Given 
the structural nature of racial inequality and the limitations of legislative reform, the 
position of African Americans in the United States continues to demand this kind of 
political and philosophical investigation. 
Using Hampton’s death to flesh out a theory in postmodern philosophy supports 
an ongoing process in which assassinated Black leaders are forgotten and distorted. 
Following this pattern, Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir prefer to interpret the social 
implications of Hampton’s assassination through the lens of British sociology and 
Frankfurt School critical theory rather than acknowledging and benefiting from the 
contribution that Black Panther literature offers to philosophy. The journalism and 
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philosophies of the Black Panthers show that the critical examination of violence is a 
philosophical endeavor, as it “seeks to author a new world from the perspectives of the 
people, and sets in motion the search for truth” (Curry “Please Don’t Make Me”, 148). 
By excluding Black Panther literature from their political analysis and by shifting the 
conversation from violence to discourse, Fraley and Lester-Roushanzamir demonstrate 
how ideology not only directs journalism, but scholarship as well. 
In the next section, I explore how contemporary scholarship on the philosophy of 
the Enlightenment often reflects authors’ assumptions about white philosophers’ 
integrity and benevolence. I examine an article by Wayne Glausser on the various 
positions in contemporary Lockean scholarship on how to properly weigh a 
philosopher’s racism against the value of their canonized philosophical works. I take 
issue with Glausser’s claim that these distinct approaches depart from one another 
primarily because of their originator’s critical predisposition toward the connections (or 
lack thereof) between theory and praxis. Instead, I suggest that the practice of severing a 
philosopher’s racist actions and theories from the rest of their scholarship is predicated 
on the assumption that Western philosophers can be self-policing when it comes to the 
issue of how to deal with a canonized figure’s historically influential actions and white 
supremacist convictions. Beyond the realm of scholarly debates, figures like Angela 
Davis show that historically, blind faith in Western philosophy’s egalitarian convictions 
has had negative consequences for masses of African descended people.  
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3. THE BLINDING LIGHT OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT: HOW THE 
BLACK NATIONALIST PERSPECTIVE UNVEILS IDEOLOGICAL 
COMMITMENTS IN PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOLARSHIP 
In his revolutionary article “Rodrigo’s Seventh Chronicle: Race, Democracy, and 
the State,” Richard Delgado draws out the inherent racism in American democracy 
through a dialogue with a fictional student, Rodrigo. In this conversation, Rodrigo points 
to the Enlightenment as a key force which makes the American form of democracy “the 
worst of all for minorities.” Anticipating the predictable retort that the theoretical 
underpinnings of American democracy are egalitarian and ideologically pro-minority, 
Rodrigo seeks to show that racism is a part of the American political system “[b]oth in 
theory and in practice” (725). Through Rodrigo, Delgado argues that the permanent 
historical and contemporary presence of racism in American democracy is not an 
unfortunate but contingent detail of its political structure, but is rather ingrained in the 
concrete and ideological essence of the system itself. In order to emphasize their 
interconnectedness, Rodrigo engages Catherine MacKinnon’s method of explaining 
gender oppression. In order to draw out a similar analysis of racism and liberal 
democracy, Rodrigo points to MacKinnon’s claim that “the sexualization of women, the 
construction of her in that role, is the very instrument of her oppression, and not in any 
contingent or means-ends sense.” Because of the inescapable “second-class status” of 
those sexualized as female in this society, “[s]exuality is a woman’s subordination, pure 
and simple.” It is no coincidence but rather a necessary fact that female sexuality and the 
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oppression of women are inseparable. This raises the question, if the coin metaphor 
could be applied to racism, where one side is “black subordination” and white racism, 
what would be on the other? Rodrigo gives the surprising answer that the variant of 
democracy born of the Enlightenment “functions for minorities as sex and sexualization 
do for women.” Applying MacKinnon’s analytical framework to racial subordination in 
the liberal state, Rodrigo emphasizes that  
enlightenment-style Western democracy is its parallel, the source of black 
people’s subordination. Not just in a causal sense...They go together; they 
are two opposite sides of the same coin (729). 
In addition to arguing for the merits of this position, I will also make the case that 
it is not possible to adequately articulate this perspective through the present framework 
that dominates the discourse on whether Locke’s political ideologies reflect his well-
documented prejudices and active financial and political support of the burgeoning slave 
trade during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In order to show this, my first step 
in this section involves a review of the three approaches to answering this question 
discussed in “Three Approaches to Locke and the Slave Trade.” Its author, Wayne 
Glausser, claims that these three positions are ultimately in disagreement about whether 
theory and practice are separable, causally connected in one direction, or fundamentally 
reciprocal in nature. However, when a racially literate approach is introduced and 
elaborated through the standpoint of Black Nationalists and their predecessors, the 
assumption that these three approaches can be distinguished without an appeal to white 
supremacist ideologies is exposed as illusory.  
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This argument unfolds in two ways. First, I take issue with Glausser’s assertion 
that the underlying disagreement over the relationship between Locke’s philosophy and 
his actions can be explained according to the authors’ “responses to the familiar 
questions of idea and act.” Their position on the this issue supposedly determines their 
“critical predisposition” toward this problem (Glausser, 200). I seek to show that a better 
case can be made for a different kind of critical predisposition which most heavily 
influences the stance one takes on racism in Locke’s philosophy. An analysis of this 
issue from the Black Nationalist perspective (to be elaborated in the next section) can 
account for a critical predisposition that is most heavily influenced by a prejudicial level 
of trust placed in whites that is costly to Blacks.   
Secondly, I seek to show how the connections between Locke’s assertions on 
slavery, just war, and punishment structurally and permanently institute a form of 
government favorable to whites (property-owning or not15) at the expense of Blacks. 
While most scholars who argue for or against the presence of justifications for slavery in 
Locke’s canonical texts address the connection between just war and slavery, few 
employ Locke’s statements on imprisonment as a central part of their analyses. 
Contrarily, I contend that the criminal justice system’s relation to both natural and civic 
rights must be interrogated in order to show how the systemic murder, abuse and 
exploitation of African Americans was able to survive the formal extinction of the 
                                                
15 See W.E.B. DuBois’s theory on the “psychological wage of whiteness,” as well as A.J. 
Williams-Myers’s concept of the “cultural community of whiteness.” Both of these indicate a 
color line in society that maintains privilege primarily for the elite and is enforced through 
violence primarily by the masses.   
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“peculiar institution” of slavery, an event that was foreseeable for the founding fathers. 
In addition to analyzing primary sources—particularly the Second Treatise—I will 
explain how this method of political analysis which centers on the role of prisons in 
controlling populations owes its origin to Black Nationalists and their predecessors.   
The danger (that I am trying to avoid) in discussing racism in the Enlightenment 
is that if we begin this inquiry by assuming at the outset that Locke is fundamentally 
liberal and that Enlightenment philosophy is righteous and sophisticated in its 
egalitarianism, we have no choice but to excuse or sanitize their claims. More 
problematically, if we assume that their theories are essential to the evaluation and 
formation of egalitarian political institutions and principles, we have no choice but to 
continue relying on and applying their ideas. Moreover, the Critical Race and Black 
Nationalist alternative to understanding racism in the Enlightenment is not based on a 
minor qualification of Glausser’s well-summarized account of conflicting critical 
predispositions toward the connections between theory and practice. Rather, the more 
radical approach that I am defending has implications that extend beyond the typical 
limits of philosophical discourse in terms of the serious consequences that accompany 
the acceptance of their ideal.  
3.1 THREE DOMINANT ANALYSES OF LOCKE’S RACISM AND THEIR 
INHERENT IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS 
In “Three Approaches to Locke and the Slave Trade,” Wayne Glausser 
summarizes three approaches to explaining how Locke’s involvement in the slave trade 
relates to his political philosophy. On one end of the spectrum are those who treat 
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accusations of racism as ad homonyms that are irrelevant to his political theory from 
which his justifications for slavery are deviations. Scholars of the opposing view hold 
that “his treatment of slavery should be seen as part of the fabric of Lockean philosophy, 
however embarrassing that might be for modern admirers of one of the founding 
liberals” (Glausser, 199). In the safe middle category we find several scholars who wish 
to treat Locke’s views on slavery as an important part of Lockean scholarship but who 
still attempt to sanitize the theories most essential to Locke’s philosophy by arguing that 
while “Locke did manage to accommodate theory to practice, [he did so] only by an 
embarrassingly tortured logic” (199). Glausser points out the challenges in evaluating 
the relative merit of these three approaches, one of which is the difficulties presented by 
the “flaws and ambiguities” in Locke’s philosophical works. His second concern—
which is of the upmost importance in this section—is that “the conclusions reached by 
various interpreters appear to depend as much on critical predisposition as on evidence” 
(200). The critical disposition guiding each of the three approaches is the author’s 
position on the “familiar questions of idea and act.” According to this analysis, the 
conservative approach sanitizes Locke’s philosophy by insisting that his personal 
practices deviated from his political principles, while the moderate approach argues that 
Locke’s practices influenced the “tortured” interpretations of his own ideals. Glausser 
explains that the third approach is determined by the philosophical commitment that 
“[t]heory and practice are inseparable, a seamless text of power relations” (200). 
James Farr is an example of a scholar who fits into Glausser’s first category. 
Although he acknowledges that Locke was “an agent of British colonialism who issued 
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instructions governing slavery,” Farr argues that Locke’s actions in this arena “do not 
inform his theory—or vice versa.” Salvaging Locke’s political philosophy, he asserts 
that Locke restricted the theory of just war in a way that made it “inapplicable to 
America” (“New World Slavery”, 495). However, his position shows some overlap 
between the first and second categories when he argues for the “tortured logic” 
interpretation of Locke’s efforts to justify chattel slavery. Farr writes that 
 if Locke intended his just war theory to justify the execrable practices of 
new world slavery, about which he knew so much, then he did a 
spectacularly bad job of it. But there are reasons to believe that he did not 
so intend the theory, in whatever contradictions this lands him. (500) 
Regardless of whether Farr is correct about Locke doing a “bad job” of using the just 
war defense in this way, Locke’s intentions were clearly to do so. In a work titled 
“Social Contract Theory, Slavery, and the Antebellum Courts,” Anita L. Allen and 
Thaddeus Pope also write about Locke’s “just war” justification for slavery. They show 
that Locke was not merely an influential as a writer, but also functioned as a political 
advisor and was able to clarify his position on the intended application of his political 
theories. Allen and Pope write: 
John Locke justified slavery on these grounds in the course of advising 
Governor Nicholson of Virginia in 1698. Locke argued that “Negro 
slaves were justifiably enslaved, having been taken captives in a ‘just 
war’ thus forfeiting their liberty” (Morrow, 1985–6: 237). (131)  
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Because of his political involvement, we have a difficult time identifying where the 
political philosopher ends and the racist businessman begins when it comes to Locke. 
For Farr, however, even if Locke the businessman did expect just war his theory to 
justify the slave trade, his practice does not relate to his theory in a way that would 
warrant an interpretation of Locke’s philosophy as being pro-slavery. Thus, Glausser’s 
second category applies to Farr here in that it is only under the most tortured logic that 
Locke’s theory could be used to justify his practice, while there are no circumstances in 
which Locke’s practices are meaningfully reflected in his theory.   
Definitely falling into Glausser’s third category, Delgado claims (via his fictional 
character Rodrigo) that the political thought of the Enlightenment was designed to 
oppress minorities, pointing out how non-whites are singled out as the minority to which 
the system which prides itself on perfectionism and completeness owes very little. For 
Rodrigo, this is not a matter of singling out a few racist statements that happened to be 
made by Enlightenment philosophers, but rather argues (speaking to racial minorities) 
that “Enlightenment philosophy is the very means by which you are rendered a 
nonperson, always one-down.” Enlightenment is not “a warm, embracing philosophy,” 
but rather, “[i]n its images, metaphors, and foundations it has exclusion and cruelty built 
in” (Delgado “Rodrigo’s Seventh”, 733). The Enlightenment’s proponents of white 
supremacy created a new grand narrative for Western civilization which has wide-
ranging aesthetic, social and political consequences. In a synopsis directed at the victims 
of this racial hierarchies, Delgado writes that “[a] thousand myths and tales, a thousand 
scripts, plots, narratives and stories will paint you as hapless, primitive, savage, 
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lascivious, and not-so-smart, suitable only for menial work.” This inequality is difficult 
to combat in the Lockean liberal democracy “because it’s all informal and implicit,” 
apparently belied by the “formal guarantees” of universal rights and natural equality 
(734). Delgado also writes that, compared to other nations that are not wrapped up so 
intimately with enlightenment philosophy, American discourse “about the state seems 
frozen at a fairly simple level” (723). Because of the system’s egalitarian rhetoric, 
minorities who protest persistent inequalities are seen as denying the progress that has 
been made. Thus the political texts of the enlightenment are glorified beyond serious 
reproach. Delgado writes that this is because perfectionism is an inherent aspect of 
Enlightenment philosophy. The most minorities can fairly ask for under these 
restrictions is gradual reform, which is founded on white trust and thus cannot be 
formally guaranteed. 
Like Glausser, I seek to uncover the philosophical commitments and assumptions 
that are manifested in the positions we take on the relevance of Locke’s stance on 
slavery. As I said before, however, I find that Glausser is mistaken in his argument that 
the ways in which philosophers generally address this problem is guided primarily by 
their stance on the relationship (or lack thereof) between theory and practice. While this 
contested relationship is a relevant issue, the claim that this is at the heart of one’s 
critical predisposition toward this problem is problematic in that it overlooks other, more 
critical ideological commitments that separate the third approach from the first two. 
Speaking to what she sees as society’s colonized consciousness, Angela Davis argues 
that we are taught not to question the idea that prisons are a necessary part of our society 
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(Are Prisons Obsolete?, 18-9). This faith in the prison system determines our critical 
predisposition toward this issue, as does placing blind trust in the ideals of the 
enlightenment and the assumptions upon which they rest.  
Almost all of the major Enlightenment philosophers were openly racist, and the 
historically decisive nature of Enlightenment thinkers’ promotions of racial hierarchies 
has been scrupulously demonstrated by intellectual historians. Regarding the rise of 
white supremacy, “[t]he tone was set during the Enlightenment, by luminaries such as 
Immanuel Kant, Johan Herder, and David Hume” (Blakely, 94). The assertion that an 
enlightenment thinkers’ philosophy can be employed to promote racial equality is 
reflective of much deeper ideological commitments than the critical predisposition is 
central to Glausser’s analysis regarding the severability of ideology and praxis. Although 
he contends that Locke’s support of the slave trade is an issue that serious scholars must 
grapple with, Glausser himself plays a more subtle part in this sanitation process by 
asserting that Locke’s philosophical claims about natural liberties were “an influential 
resource for abolitionist thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.” This 
assertion that a modern philosopher’s racist theories can be sanitized by his own 
philosophy has been made by other scholars. In his essay, “‘A Lousy Empirical 
Scientist’: Reconsidering Hume’s Racism,” Andrew Valls addresses Hume’s statements 
explicitly positing the superiority of the white race and his emphasis on the inferiority of 
the black race. However, he gives a definite ‘no’ to “the question of whether the whole 
of Hume’s philosophy is somehow racially coded, whether these remarks reflect 
something deep within his thought.” After arguing that Hume’s racism is belied by his 
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“commit[ment] to the universality of human nature and the (rough) equality of human 
beings,” Valls even goes so far as to say that “Hume’s philosophical views provide the 
resources to explain and correct Hume’s own racialism” (127). Regarding Lockean 
scholarship, Robert Bernasconi and Anika Maaza Mann reference the assertion that 
Locke is “the father of these natural rights, in the name of which, according to a familiar 
story, the slaves were subsequently to be freed” in their article “The Contradictions of 
Racism: Locke, Slavery and the Two Treatises.” Bernasconi and Mann explain that 
“...the tradition of Locke as a promoter of ideas that are a theoretical resource against 
oppression is so strong that some are reluctant to see him in another light” (90). 
 One of the major consequences of admitting to major contradictions and 
inadequacies in the philosophical canon is that it wounds whites’ pride in their thought 
and culture which has been built up through the Enlightenment and prejudicial political, 
financial, aesthetic, and social relations. The need to consult African literature in order to 
correct injustices and flaws in Western political thought carries with it the implication 
that Western philosophy on its own is incomplete. (However, African American 
philosophers who wish to participate in white-dominated academia are always already 
expected to assimilate, and thus to proceed as though their systems are incomplete.) 
Another upshot of interrogating and problemetizing how the present political situation 
relates to the ugly, violent past of slavery is that it raises the question of what reparations 
whites should be expected to make given the extent of the damage that they have 
inflicted on Blacks largely through the political system.  
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 3.2 SLAVERY, PRISONS, AND OTHER MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
JUSTIFIED BY THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT   
In Locke’s political writings, slavery, prisons, and colonialism are all connected 
under one political system. I contend that the key to understanding Enlightenment 
philosophy’s most destructive caveat can be found in their canonical figures’ statements 
concerning the right to punish and restrain offenders. Enlightenment political thought 
paved the way for the American prison system16 largely by including in it design for a 
democratic society a division between those “with reason” who were worthy of 
participating in this government and those who were uncivilized and thus were owed 
nothing. Through the revocation of the rights of prisoners to be treated as citizens, the 
political philosophy of the Enlightenment willfully carved out an exception to a 
government’s duty to respect the rights of all of its subjects. In their establishment of a 
white-supremacist American political system, “[t]he framers reinforced and legitimated 
a system of racist oppression that they thought would ensure that whites, especially 
white men of means, would rule for centuries to come” (Feagin, Racist America, 14). 
Thinkers like Locke had this specifically in mind when they envisioned and 
implemented this arrangement on a global scale. An honest examination of this history is 
instrumental in demonstrating that the categorical oppression of the Black race is not a 
contradiction to the egalitarian political principles of the Enlightenment. Rather, the 
system allows for and necessitates this caveat. In the following section, I will elaborate 
on the importance of prisons in America’s enlightenment-style democracy by appealing 
                                                
16 Cf. Davis  
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to the works of Angela Davis and W.E.B. DuBois in order to demonstrate the prison 
system’s structural significance in the American democratic state. 
According to the Second Treatise, it is the capacity to reason that grants a subject 
freedom in civil society. However, it is not something that everyone is born with, and 
cannot develop fully until adulthood. Locke mentions this when he explains the 
conditions according to which paternal power is justified, though not in an absolute or 
political sense (Book II, Sec. 170). However, this argument indicates that the 
development of reason under the guide of paternal power is a necessary steppingstone to 
the maturity required for freedom and participation in a democratic government. By this 
logic, those who were brought into a society against their will under the just war defense 
of slavery can be forced into bondage for generations due to the fact that they are 
individuals lacking reason who have been brought into civil society (though not as 
participants or by consent) and subsequently are restricted in their freedom due to their 
lack of reason as a culture. Their lack of reason is in part evidenced by the fact that they 
have not formed what qualifies to Locke as a civil society (that is, a social compact 
founded on reason). Locke argued that freedom for the slaves would terrify them due to 
their lack of ability to care for themselves because of their supposed lack of reason and 
barbaric culture. 
Individuals do not suddenly acquire the capacities such as reason when they enter 
a social compact, but rather do so out of their pre-existing reason. Locke certainly 
believed that African descended people inherited what he saw as their race’s low 
capacity for reason, which in turn justified their continued enslavement. While this may 
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appear to fundamentally contradict his natural rights doctrine, he was still able to 
consistently hold this racist view by denying equalities in capacity (Book II, Sec. 54). 
Additionally, his racism is supported in his assertion that forming a civil society is a 
purely rational act, which in turn implies that those who have not done so are behind 
Europe in terms of their rationality and thus lag in other crucial areas of development 
(Boxill, 165). Having argued against inherited or divinely ordained political power, 
Locke wasn’t able to say outright that certain people were born slaves. Rather, they had 
to be made so by civil society, which required structural accommodations for denying 
certain individuals’ otherwise natural right to be free. Those structural accommodations 
are usually placed in close proximity to Locke’s statements on the limits of political 
power. 
Locke advocates for the “just war” rationalization of slavery in his Second 
Treatise of Government, where he writes, “This is the perfect condition of slavery, which 
is nothing else, but the state of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a 
captive.” (Book II, Sec. 24) The “conquest” or “just war” justification for the institution 
of slavery demonstrates how the philosophy of the Enlightenment and the American 
democratic state that established a white hierarchical anthropology is intimately 
connected with the problem of imperialism. Most analyses of Locke’s stance on slavery 
point to his just war justification for slavery and argue for or against its consistency with 
the rest of Locke’s system and his other statements on slavery. In “Locke, Natural Law, 
and New World Slavery,” Farr claims that “Locke’s only theory of slavery” the “just-
war” defense (496). While he speaks to Locke’s statements on the right to kill, confine 
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or enslave prisoners of war, he does not address the significant exceptions that Locke 
makes regarding the freedom that may be justifiably revoked from ordinary prisoners. In 
addition, he also used a lack of reason as the excuse for imprisoning and forcing into 
labor those who committed crimes. The racial significance of this category of persons 
“without reason” is important to keep in mind given that those who Locke defined 
categorically as being without reason were also the ones whose numbers surged in 
prisons following the formal abolition of slavery. Irrationality and racial inferiority owe 
their union to the ideology of the Enlightenment.17 
The racialization of crime emerged when racialized slavery was formally 
prohibited. The language with which Locke justifies imprisonment closely parallels his 
remarks on the racialization of irrationality. In order to racialize slavery for the first time 
in history,18 defenders of the slave trade such as Locke argued against the enslavement of 
whites and thus inextricably linked white supremacy to anti-Black racism. The 
passionate attacks on slavery in Locke’s writing were written in defense of whites such 
as those who were kidnapped or sent as prisoners to America and forced into labor.19 
While this could be misinterpreted to apply to all enslavement, these statements are 
qualified in the Second Treatise when Locke clarifies the contingencies of freedom. 
According to Locke, the two clear conditions of freedom are: 1) that the subject must be 
                                                
17 Cf. Eze 
18 Among many other available sources on the invention of racialized slavery during this time 
period, see Reiss.  
19 James Farr contextualizes Locke’s anti-slavery remarks in the Two Treatises of Government to 
explain this intention in “‘So Vile and Miserable an Estate’: The Problem of Slavery in Locke’s 
Political Thought.” 
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rational, and 2) otherwise not a threat to the society that they inhabit. As Williams-
Myers points out in his book, Destructive Impulses: An Examination of an American 
Secret in Race Relations: White Violence, the concept that whites as a race were unfit for 
enslavement did not always exist but rather developed along with the racist justifications 
for the enslavement of millions of people stolen from Africa.20 This assumption 
developed over time as philosophers of the Enlightenment began to advocate both for 
whites’ natural rights to be free and for Blacks’ alleged inferiority. 
Prisons serve as the ultimate accommodating structure that allows the oppression, 
murder and enslavement of African Americans to continue regardless of rhetoric 
promising formal progress. In the Second Treatise, Locke explains how the state is to 
deny criminals their rights to life, liberty, property, and freedom from enslavement. 
One’s status as a prisoner is by definition one devoid of freedom according to Hobbes 
and Locke.21 Hobbes in fact had a “narrow definition of slavery as entailing actual 
imprisonment (‘a Captive, which is kept in prison, or bonds’)...” (Baumgold, 413).  
Arguing that punishment and confinement are essential tools for defending a civilized 
society, Locke writes: 
In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by 
another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that 
                                                
20 Williams-Myers makes this point in chapter 3 in which he lists three key secrets of American 
race relations, the first of which is that the inconceivability of whites enslaving whites has not 
always existed, as the idea was acceptable in a case cited by Williams-Myers in 1607. 
21 Baumgold articulates Hobbes’s portrayal of imprisonment and freedom as opposites.  
50 
 
measure God has set to the actions of men…and so he becomes 
dangerous to mankind… (Book II, Sec. 8).   
The gravity of these transgressions justifies harsh and oppressive measures (including 
coerced labor) which are taken in order to protect the rest of society from the threat they 
pose to members of the public who possess reason. The right to punish exists in the state 
of nature and continues when a social compact is formed. As a part of the social 
compact, however, the natural right of all rational men to inflict punishment on 
offenders is given up to “the magistrate, who by being magistrate, hath the common 
right of punishing put into his hands…” (Book II, Sec. 11) Regardless, if individuals are 
labeled as offenders by the state, then the state is no longer obligated to protect their 
right to property and is legally permitted to confine and punish them according to 
Locke’s system.  
An objection to this interpretation could be to point out Locke’s arguments for 
restrictions on the severity of punishment according to the severity of the offense. By 
these limitations, no one has the right in the state of nature “to use a Criminal when he 
has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of 
his own Will…” (Book II, Sec. 8). The punishment must be limited to proportional 
reparation and restraint. But in civil society people can rightfully be made examples 
those who break the laws established by those with political power, as the latter have the 
right to “mak[e] Laws with Penalties of Death, and consequently all less penalties...” 
(Book II, Sec. 3). While he appears in Section 8 to be making an unequivocal statement 
that punishments must fit the crimes, Locke provides a vague loophole to this formal 
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restriction and thus grants an accommodating structure by which the state could revoke 
the rights of certain subjects. Addressing the range of penalties for offenders (including 
death) in Book II, Sec. 12, Locke writes that “Each Transgression may be punished to 
that degree, and with so much Severity as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the 
Offender, give him cause to repent, and terrifie others from doing the like” (emphasis 
mine). To use Williams-Myers’s phrase, the state has the right to do whatever they judge 
is necessary to make individuals “stand in fear” as a means of controlling their behavior 
on a comprehensive scale. Following the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, the 
transformation of the institution of slavery into the racially discriminatory prison system 
was such that the state’s method of controlling African Americans through fear of 
violence was thoroughly maintained in order that slavery might continue.   
Those falling into Glausser’s first category (which holds that “[i]n no way can 
Locke’s theory be said to support chattel slavery as practiced on the American 
plantations”) often cite as evidence Locke’s prohibition against the inheritance of 
enslavement (206). Regarding the slave conquered in a just war, “the Children, whatever 
may have happened to the Fathers, are Free-men, and the Absolute Power of the 
Conquerour reaches no farther than the Persons of the Men, that were subdued by him, 
and dies with them ”(Book II, Sec. 189). Despite their shared views on Black inferiority, 
this appears to be in conflict with Hobbes’s mandate in the Leviathan that “[t]he master 
of the servant is master also of all he hath, and may exact the use thereof; that is to say, 
of his goods, of his labour, of his servants, and of his children, as often as he shall think 
fit” (emphasis mine) (Ch. 20, Sec.13). However, Locke’s statements condemning the 
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inheritance of enslavement do not contradict the chattel slave trade with which he was 
personally involved. Locke was investing in the slave trade and supporting it through his 
political offices and writings during a time when the companies with which he was 
involved were struggling to meet the demand for the importation of more slaves.  
In defense of the egalitarian foundation of the Two Treatises, one might point out 
that Locke argues for the state’s duty to protect the right of property. However, like 
personal freedom, this mandate is not absolute but is qualified according to how 
individuals measure up to certain standards of reason that are elaborated in the Second 
Treatise. There are explicit exceptions to property rights that provide structural 
accommodations by which colonizers can justifiably usurp another’s property. After 
saying that everyone has the right of property over their persons, labor, and the objects in 
which they invest their labor, Locke adds what seems on the surface to be a reasonable 
qualification but is in fact the mantra of imperialism. Arguing that there are certain 
“bounds, set by reason of what might serve for...use,” Locke lays out certain guidelines 
according to which no one has the right to waste or misuse their property or land (Book 
II, Sec 31). In order to explain Locke’s attempts to justify slavery through his just war 
ideology, Seliger point’s to “Locke’s theory of waste land,” according to which “people 
occupying (or claiming as property) land that they either cannot or will not develop may 
become aggressors against those who can or would develop that land” (Glausser, 208). 
Those who resist can rightfully be treated as prisoners of a just war. While Seliger (who 
falls into Glausser’s second category of Locke scholars) argues that these oppressive 
claims are the result of tortured logic, Locke holds that “[n]othing was made by God for 
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Man to spoil or destroy.” With this in mind, Locke identifies currency as the medium of 
exchange by which one can avoid such waste. We can posit from this that this economic 
system based on monetary exchange is necessary and can be pressed upon other nations 
without twisting his words.     
Through its accommodating structures of property, prisons, and just war, the 
enlightenment not only laid the ideological foundations for white supremacy, but also 
outlined the accommodating structures by which a society could construct an ideal form 
of government in which all subjects formally had natural rights while simultaneously 
maintaining its racial order. Additionally, accommodating structures (such as the 
revocation of the rights of members of the community to be treated as citizens once they 
are imprisoned) allow for significant formal exceptions to the promise of freedom in 
Western democracies. In The Racial Contract, Charles Mills explains that these 
exceptions to egalitarian rules based on race are not implicit in a contingent sense. 
Rather, “race is in no way an ‘afterthought,’ a ‘deviation’ from ostensibly raceless 
Western ideals, but rather a central shaping constituent of those ideals” (14). According 
to Mills, “white supremacy should be thought of as itself a political system” in which 
whites form a “contract” with one another by which their rights under a certain form of 
government are as a rule protected on the basis of their race (7). This theory is not 
merely abstract, but has a historical basis which will be addressed in the following 
section.  
  
54 
 
3.3 BLACK NATIONALISTS’ CRITIQUE OF ACCOMMODATING STRUCTURES 
AND THE DECEPTIVENESS OF ENLIGHTENMENT RHETORIC 
While Glausser raises important issues regarding how our assumptions about the 
relations between theory and practice guide much of our philosophical thinking, I argue 
that his method of analyzing the three categories of approaching Lockean racism leaves 
out an additional contribution that Black Nationalist social theory (and other similar 
Critical Race positions) could make to this discourse. The key to identifying this missing 
element lies in an unapologetic, race-conscious analysis of how whites’ critical 
predispositions regarding race and white supremacy guide their explanations of the 
meaning and impact of racism in philosophy. An understanding of Davis’s work on 
slavery, prison, and American politics is essential for producing an adequate framework 
through which to understand why racism in the Enlightenment has influence far beyond 
what the scholars in Glausser’s first two categories are willing to concede. This 
discussion will show how Davis’s rejection of many political theorists’ critical 
predisposition toward the blind acceptance of the prison system plays a much greater 
role in separating her approach to slavery and the philosophy of the enlightenment.  
Citing the radical and dramatic change in the racial composition of the prison 
system following the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, Davis writes that the 
institution of slavery was transformed rather than abolished in any meaningful sense of 
the term. This is because the prison system allowed for an exception to the formal 
prohibition of involuntary servitude in the case of incarcerated individuals. In her 
groundbreaking book, Are Prisons Obsolete?, Davis explains that the prison system 
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allowed whites to continue to keep black people in chains. Not only were Black 
prisoners uncompensated for their labor, but they were also in the same—if not worse—
position regarding their rights to life and freedom from physical abuse during slavery.  
Davis engages with her predecessors Frederick Douglass and W.E.B. DuBois in 
her work, “From the Prison of Slavery to the Slavery of Prison: Frederick Douglass and 
the Convict Lease System.” In this piece, Davis accounts for Frederick “Douglass’s 
silence regarding the post-Civil War southern system of convict lease, which transferred 
symbolically significant numbers of black people from the prison of slavery to the 
slavery of prison” (Davis Reader, 75). While salvaging and upholding Douglass’s key 
contributions to the discourse on slavery and prisons, Davis seeks in this work to explain 
how “blackness is ideologically linked to criminality in ways that are more complicated 
and pernicious than Douglass ever could have imagined” (75). Of central importance 
regarding her interpretation of Douglass’s philosophy is Davis’s argument that 
“Enlightenment principles and a philosophy of history that accorded the bourgeois state 
a foundational role in guaranteeing racial progress…militated against an understanding 
of the prison system, and its specific role in preserving and deepening structures of 
racism” (92).  
While laws like the Black Codes were enacted following the abolition of slavery, 
the political ideology in place prior to these new laws had already established the use of 
the criminal justice system as a means of oppression. Although Douglass protested the 
horrific conditions in the prison system before the legislature, he still believed that 
formal emancipation made black people the owners of their labor. Confined 
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conceptually within these democratic principles of formal rights, Douglass saw the vote 
as the path to blacks’ meaningful inclusion in the democratic process and identified their 
labor as the key to their freedom. Douglass recalls how any attempt by an enslaved 
person to provide for his or her own personal well-being through the possession of 
property—“‘[t]o eat the fruit of his own toil’”—was considered to be a form of theft 
(74). Douglass believed that the end of slavery would eventually allow for an 
improvement in blacks’ overall material conditions now that they were formally given 
property rights in regards to their own labor. Davis explains that he consequently 
believed that as this material progress occurred, they would gradually “cease to be 
treated as a criminalized class” (75).   
In contrast, Davis explains that DuBois deviated from Douglass in that he 
seriously addressed these issues in his article “The Spawn of Slavery: The Convict Lease 
System of the South,” which is an indication that DuBois was not intellectually confined 
by the Enlightenment philosophers. However, Davis reports that although this article, 
which was published in 1901, “proposed a radical analysis, it seems that it was not 
widely read or discussed” (77). His work has much philosophical import in this 
discussion, as DuBois stood apart from other philosophers by not thinking solely within 
the parameters of Enlightenment thought. Rather, DuBois presented an anti-colonial 
framework which was to become a guiding method of investigating the nature of racism 
in America in African American philosophy, particularly during the 1960s. DuBois’s 
work continues to be underappreciated and is still not widely discussed in academic 
philosophy. This is perhaps because he challenged the central assumptions of the 
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Enlightenment philosophy and questioned what was taken most for granted about the 
necessity of prisons and property rights. By exposing these institutions’ undemocratic 
nature and contesting the views of the most progressive public intellectuals, Davis writes 
that “Du Bois’s analysis of the convict lease system implicitly contested Douglass’s 
construction of black labor as ‘free’” (81). DuBois’s interpretation here is supported by 
later statements made by the National Committee on Prison Labor in 1911, which 
maintained that “[t]he State has a property right in the labor of the prisoner” (78). Blacks 
continued to be colonized as a people, and DuBois posited radical, anti-colonial 
challenges to the injustices rampant in the capitalist-driven criminal justice system. 
According to Davis’s interpretation of his statements on prisoners and property, “[w]ith 
the abolition of the profit motive, Du Bois seemed to imply, a powerful incentive for the 
racism at the core of the system would cease to exist” (89). DuBois and Davis show us 
how the social contract cannot be evaluated solely in terms of the state’s obligation to 
protect property rights—it is essential to critically examine the state’s property rights 
relative to its subjects.  
Davis argues that this historical and philosophical investigation has concrete 
relevance to American political activism, as “by understand Douglass’s reluctance to 
directly oppose the penitentiary system of his era, we may acquire much needed insight 
into the difficulties activists encounter today in organizing movements against the 
contemporary prison industrial complex” (92). This is a particularly crucial project 
today, as “at the close of the twentieth century, carceral regulation of black communities 
has reached crisis proportions.” Not only does the United States have the highest 
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incarceration rate in the world, but they are also transparently predisposed to arrest, 
incarcerate, and execute black individuals at far beyond the rates of whites. For a 
complete understanding of how and why this came to be, Davis appeals to “Douglass’s 
historical views on the criminalization of black communities and the racialization of 
crime” as her point of departure in this particular work (75). This historical analysis 
provided by Douglass will aid her in her overall philosophical project of identifying how 
the “ideological and institutional carryovers from slavery began to fortify the equation of 
blackness and criminality in the U.S” (75). 
Davis’s analysis of Douglass’s delayed reaction to the convict-lease system 
provides crucial insight into how Enlightenment thinkers have served to incarcerate the 
imagination22 by subtly prohibiting particularly threatening forms of criticism against the 
state. This is another critical predisposition that has a greater impact on one’s analysis of 
the connections between slavery and the political ideals that shaped the American 
democratic state than one’s implicit assumptions about ideology’s relationship to action. 
It is worth noting not only what Douglass observed about the persistence of racial 
oppression after the formal abolition of slavery, but also what someone of his 
intelligence, experience, and education failed for a long time to notice. Frederick 
Douglass defined slavery as “the granting of that power by which one man exercises and 
enforces a right of property in the body and soul of another” (74). While it is true that the 
Thirteenth Amendment formally prohibited this practice, Davis zeros in on the caveat 
which was immediately seized upon on a comprehensive scale after its passage in 1865: 
                                                
22 “Incarcerated imagination” is Davis’ term.  
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“‘Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof 
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or anyplace 
subject to its jurisdiction’ (emphasis added)” (76). It is important to notice how the 
language of this loophole so closely parallels Locke’s choice of words in his argument 
for the exclusion of prisoners from the group of individuals protected by the social 
contract (and thus involuntary servitude). 
On the surface, it may appear logical that gravity of certain transgressions makes 
it so that harsh and oppressive measures may be taken in order to protect the rest of 
society from the threat they pose to public safety.23 However, Douglass points out that 
the gross majority of reasons that were given for Blacks’ incarceration (such as 
vagrancy) did not warrant any kind of confinement based on the goal of public safety. 
Confirming Douglass’s observations, Davis catalogs the crimes for which black people 
could be incarcerated and forced to work in chain gangs which were known as the 
“Black Codes.” She also explains how the Black Codes which so immediately followed 
the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment were constructed not to protect society but to 
ensure that black people would continue to be deprived of their own rights to protection. 
Like many other black leaders, however, Douglass did not identify the incarceration of 
black people as a predominant method of racial oppression and “also failed to recognize 
that black boys and girls were not exempt from the convict labor system,” which in itself 
                                                
23 The nature of punishment and crime is an issue that has been discussed at length in the 
Philosophy of Law and other philosophers have provided justifications for the existence of the 
criminal justice system, such as those found in Punishment as Societal Defense. However, those 
reasons are inapplicable here because of their obviously corrupt implementation in American 
democratic state.  
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highlights the absurdity of the societal defense justification for punishment in this 
context (Davis Reader, 78).   
Davis’s historical methodology should not call into question the ultimately 
philosophical nature of her work, as it is used to demonstrate how easy it is to ignore the 
existence and purposes of these caveats apart from their implementation by those who 
intended to use them in defense of their corruption. The first two steps to demonstrating 
the philosophical import of Douglass’s inadequate opposition to the convict leasing 
system include exposing how the American criminal justice system functioned to 
provide labor for the convict leasing system, and secondly showing that Douglass’s 
writings and public statements indicate that he was generally aware of the system’s 
abuses. From here, Davis interprets Douglass’s failure to vigorously oppose the convict 
leasing system at the crucial historical juncture during which it was just beginning to 
emerge and was thus more vulnerable than it would be twenty years later when Douglass 
started to accept the gravity of its implications for black liberation. The Lockean caveat 
to the social contract which is also present in the Thirteenth Amendment blinded 
Douglass at this crucial moment.  
Davis cites Mildred Fierce’s extensive study on the convict lease system in 
which Fierce contends that during this time, “‘black leaders fell victim to the notion that 
‘criminals’ were getting what they deserved and, despite the cruelty of convict leasing, a 
crusade on behalf of prisoners was not seen as more important than fighting the lynching 
bee, opposing voting restrictions, or protesting the acts of racial bigotry that abounded’” 
(77). Douglass failed to use his political power to fight the prison system due to his 
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inability to recognize the centrality of the prison system in the extension of the 
institution of slavery. Explaining the ideological causes for this lack of recognition, 
Davis recalls how “Douglass continued to define freedom as access to political rights” 
which were by definition unavailable to those who were incarcerated. 
Davis emphasizes the concrete historical consequences of this theoretical 
confinement, arguing that when “Douglass’s voice was most needed to trouble the rise 
of this new form of slavery—experienced directly by thousands of black people and 
symbolically by millions—his political loyalties to the Republican Party and his absolute 
faith in principles of Enlightenment seemed to blind him to the role the federal 
government was playing in the development of convict leasing and peonage” (77).  Like 
Douglass in the case of the convict leasing system, academic philosophers today run the 
risk of overlooking crucial issues because they are blinded by interpretations of 
Enlightenment philosophy which sacrifice a comprehensive study of the text in favor of 
a charitable interpretation which ignores its infelicities.24 
Delgado argues that Enlightenment philosophy was structured so that opposing 
views would be categorically excluded or judged in relation to a conflicting system that 
already determines itself to be superior to all other systems. Attempts to criticize a 
system that declares itself to be perfect and complete by definition must take place in the 
form of polemics (Delgado “Rodrigo’s Seventh”, 732). Any problems and contradictions 
in the American democratic state are still typically criticized as being misapplications of 
                                                
24 Lewis Gordon warns against ignoring such infelicities and identifies this project as a “theodicy 
of the text.” 
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Enlightenment egalitarian principles. In Davis’s analysis, these problems are cast in a 
new light as being recurring symptoms of a fundamentally corrupt system meant to 
curtail or stall certain kinds of progress. Douglass’s critical stance toward the American 
government was undermined by his faith in the doctrine of gradualism (slow progress 
that is achieved through cooperation with the state) and democracy, prioritizing the 
ballot as the primary method of emancipation. Douglass’s effectiveness at truly ending 
the enslavement and institutional oppression of black people was compromised by his 
ideological allegiance to the state, “which was combined with an Enlightenment 
philosophy of history that emphasized inevitable future progress for the former slaves” 
(Davis Reader, 79). Davis’s genealogical method of exposing this philosophical 
propaganda about the American political system demonstrates the importance of fact-
sensitivity in political theory, as the loopholes are easy to overlook if we fail to pay 
careful attention to how seemingly democratic institutions have been used throughout 
American history to oppress people of color. It is no coincidence that this was the 
explicit goal of the Enlightenment philosophers who produced this political ideology. 
Black Nationalists seek to demonstrate that the institution of slavery and the 
mass incarceration of black people in America cannot be discussed separately from the 
global colonization of Africa and all of its descendants. Black Nationalist thinkers have 
created a philosophy that interprets and provides a compelling justification for why the 
prison system, which replaced the institution of slavery as the primary method of white 
domination, cannot be accurately explained outside of the broader context of 
colonization. When Black Nationalists like Davis, Eldrige Cleaver, George Jackson, and 
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Joy James are brought into this discussion, it becomes possible to make a much tighter 
argument that the criminalization of blackness which replaced the formal institution of 
slavery is a type of warfare. In “Political Prisoners, Prisons, and Black Liberation,” 
Davis argues that one of the political functions of the prison system is to prevent a 
revolution before it can get started (Davis Reader, 39-52). “Political prisoners” as a 
category encompasses not only those like herself who are imprisoned for their allegiance 
to a radical political ideology, but also includes black people who are incarcerated in 
large numbers as a means of oppressing an entire racial group for political reasons. 
In addition to those who experience the most abject form of slavery through the 
prison system, Michelle Alexander writes that Blacks were kept in a state of near-slavery 
through Jim Crow laws. The insight that serves as a point of departure for Alexander’s 
book The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness is the 
“dynamic, which legal scholar Reva Siegel has dubbed ‘preservation through 
transformation,’ is the process through which white privilege is maintained, though the 
rules and rhetoric change” (21). Following the formal abolition of slavery, the rhetoric 
connected with whites’ property became less explicit, though their violent and 
exploitative actions. The unity of violence, racism and exploitation that made chattel 
slavery possible remained through the law, the white mob, and the police state following 
the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. Jackson explains that the state serves to unify 
whites’ exploitation of and violence against African Americans, writing that “[t]he pig is 
an instrument of neoslavery…he is pushed to the front by the men who exercise the 
unnatural right over property” (Soledad, 191-2).  
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Segregation (following Blacks’ official emancipation) protected whites’ sense of 
their racial superiority, which was enforced through systematic lynching and 
imprisonment. For over a century journalists and activists like Ida B. Wells have sought 
to undermine whites’ excuses for violence, “offer[ing] provocative evidence that these 
practices were particularly malevolent and barbarous.” The connections between the 
Enlightenment and colonial history directly affected the values and practices of whites in 
the U.S. In the following section, I will solidify this link by explaining in more detail 
how Black Nationalists understand themselves to be a domestically colonized people, 
subject to whites’ violence and whites’ collective economic exploitation (which 
implicates all whites who benefit). Arguing that “no one colonizes innocently,” Césaire 
unapologetically implicates the whole of Western civilization that rationalizes, tolerates, 
or actively participates in colonialism. He writes that “a civilization which justifies 
colonization—and therefore force—is already a sick civilization, a civilization which is 
morally diseased, which irresistibly, progressing from one consequence to another, one 
denial to another, calls for its Hitler, I mean its punishment” (39). Enlightenment ideals 
were in fact useful to Hitler in his writing of Mein Kampf, in which “he spoke of Jews 
and Blacks in phrases eerily reminiscent of Kant’s essay on ‘The Beautiful and 
Sublime’” (Blakely, 96-7). Hitler wrote that the Jews “‘culturally...contaminate art, 
literature, the theatre, make a mockery of natural feeling, overthrow all concepts of 
beauty and sublimity...’” (97). Citing this excerpt in her piece titled “European 
Dimensions of the African Diaspora: The Definition of Black Racial Identity,” Allison 
Blakely refers to a particularly analogous passage in Kant’s aforementioned work in 
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which he asserts the “fundamental differences between these two races of man,” placing 
generally flattering depictions of Europeans alongside “‘[t]he African Negro [who] by 
nature has no feelings which rise above the trifling’” (94). Kant claims that even if 
African descended individuals are technically freed from slavery, they do not possess the 
mental qualities necessary for making them respectable human beings. (This is 
significant in light of Locke’s insistence that those who lack rationality are a threat to a 
society of those who possess it, which is the language he uses when he justifies 
imprisonment.) Citing another influential thinker of that period, Kant continues that 
“‘Mr. Hume challenges anyone to cite an example in which a Negro has shown talents, 
and asserts that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who are transported 
elsewhere from their countries, although many of them have even been set free, still not 
a single one was ever found who presented anything great in art or science or any other 
praise-worthy quality, even though among whites some continually rise aloft from the 
lowest rabble, and through superior gifts earn respect in the world’” (Kant, 110-1). 25  
It is doubtful that Kant was unaware of how these words would be taken, and 
there is ample evidence that Enlightenment thinkers understood exactly how these 
statements would be used to justify colonialism. They also had an accurate 
understanding of the atrocities that the slave trade entailed, particularly Locke given his 
                                                
25 I argue that this indicates that race for Kant was not simply a matter of social setting or 
circumstances. Much of Enlightenment was meant to establish a scientific, historical, and 
philosophical basis for white supremacy.  
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travels and direct involvement.26 Speaking to his influence, Bernasconi and Mann 
explain how “Locke was one of the principal architects of a racialized form of slavery 
whose severity was by no means predestined” (90). Thus, the trade which took the lives 
of millions of Africans (and the colonization that led to systematic genocide against the 
stolen lands’ native inhabitants) owes much its ideological justification to the 
Enlightenment. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
As contemporary scholars continue to cite Enlightenment thinkers to support 
aesthetic and political claims, it is irresponsible not to remain consistently vigilant of the 
atrocities and racism that these works intentionally justified, the effects of which are still 
felt today.27 In her discussion of Hitlerism as well as contemporary scholarship,28 
Blakely emphasizes Kant’s and Hume’s decisive contribution to race prejudice. 
Speaking to their racist publications, Blakely reports that “Hume[‘s]...and Kant’s early 
pronouncements became the accepted wisdom for centuries to follow” (96). One’s 
predisposition toward admiring these white supremacist thinkers ensures that the texts 
which are not explicitly about race are viewed as more “basic” to their philosophy.  
                                                
26 For further evidence on the consciousness with which Locke and Hobbes promoted these 
genocidal practices, see Baumgold. 
27 There are too many possible sources to list for this claim, as this is a principle to which anti-
colonialist scholars and most critical race scholars adhere. For one particularly accessible 
analysis of the connections between slavery and present income inequality in America, see Joe 
Feagin’s work on whites’ continued “unjust enrichment” due to the enslavement of Africans that 
was practiced on American soil for the majority of whites’ history in America. While this claim 
is recurrent in Feagin’s scholarship, it is espoused in his book, Racist America.  
28 Blakely argues that this ideology continues to infect Western thought, citing as an example 
contemporary author Dinesh D’Souza’s utilization of Kant’s writings “to lend respectability to 
more recent postulations of black inferiority” (97). Blakely is referring to D’Souza’s book, The 
End of Racism. 
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The suggestion that Locke’s political writings are usable as an abolitionist 
resource indicates the extent to which scholars are willing to go in order to avoid reading 
black philosophers like DuBois and Douglass. That these scholars would actually 
suggest that a slave-trader’s texts are instrumental in tearing down justifications for 
slavery shows how deep whites’ academic prejudices go. With all of its tortured logic 
and contradictions, academics still treat Locke’s work as superior to the plethora of 
abolitionist writings by thinkers like DuBois and Douglass that account for and avoid 
anti-Black prejudice when speaking about egalitarianism.  
To emphasize the necessity of including enlightenment thinkers’ statements on 
race in any serious study of their work, I believe that the engraving on the Jefferson 
Memorial presents a helpful example for why this is the case. Like John Locke, Thomas 
Jefferson is a poor source on abolitionism due to his brutality as a slave-owner, his 
contribution to promoting anti-Black ideology in his Notes on the State of Virginia, and 
his significant political and financial support for the institution of slavery (despite his 
two-faced rhetoric on equality, freedom, and weak objections to slavery). Yet, “his 
famous words on the subject are those now inscribed on the Jefferson Memorial in 
Washington, D.C.: ‘Nothing is more certainly written in the book of fate than that these 
people are to be free.’” However, the sentence that immediately followed this statement 
is “omitted on this monument: ‘Nor is it less certain that the two races, equally free, 
cannot live in the same government’” (Feagin Racist America, 69). It is one thing to 
make a rigorous argument that Jefferson’s enlightenment-influenced egalitarian rhetoric 
is more “basic” to his political philosophy than his racist political texts. It is another 
68 
 
thing to suggest that there is no prevarication in omitting, for example, the statement 
immediately following Jefferson’s engraved quotation. Such a supposition is on par with 
claiming that Lockean scholarship on liberalism and democracy that does not 
consistently remain vigilant of his racism commits no epistemic injustice.29 In the 
closing of his piece, “The Study of the Negro Problems,” W.E.B. DuBois writes that 
“there is but one coward on earth, and that is the coward that dare not know” 
(“Problems”, 27). 
Anti-Colonialists consider this interrogation of racism in Western civilization to 
be paramount to successfully liberating people of color from the oppressive values and 
structures of imperialist, white supremacist nations. They share Black Nationalists’ 
concern that if colonized subjects hold unrealistic beliefs in their colonizers’ potential 
for change, they will fall prey to imperialists’ increasingly complex tactics for 
intellectual, emotional, and physical domination of Blacks by whites. In his piece 
“Racism and Culture,” Anti-Colonialist Frantz Fanon “[t]he social constellation, the 
cultural whole, are deeply modified by the existence of racism” (African Revolution, 36). 
He warns that “[t]he habit of considering racism as a mental quirk, as a psychological 
flaw,” supports the “verbal mystification” through which whites cover up their 
imperialist practices and the colonial values that now infect their culture (37-8). In 
particular, the egalitarian language of Western democratic governments is used to 
mystify their tyrannical behavior. The Anti-Colonialists discussed in the next section 
present historical patterns of colonizers’ destructive practices and use this knowledge to 
                                                
29 ‘Epistemic Injustice’ is a term taken from Brady Heiner. 
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undermine the myth that colonization has a civilizing effect and places societies in 
contact.30 Like Black Nationalists, Anti-Colonialists produce scholarship uses a new 
vocabulary to construct a radical theoretical framework for evaluating political power—
one that skeptical of the possibility of adequately reforming imperialist governments 
from within. 
  
                                                
30 Césaire gives a definitive ‘no’ to the question: “has colonization really placed civilizations in 
contact?” (33). 
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4. THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF BLACK 
POWER  
My primary objective has been to show how contemporary academic philosophy 
actively maintains racist ideologies by excluding non-white perspectives from serious 
consideration. In order to begin the long process of correcting its prejudices, academic 
philosophy must begin to treat Black Nationalists as social theorists. By surveying the 
works of thinkers including W.E.B. DuBois, Frantz Fanon, Derrick Bell and Aime ́ 
Césaire, I make the case that an academic environment that excludes or tokenizes these 
perspectives also excuses our ignorance of the long-standing philosophical tradition of 
Black thought upon which Black Nationalist theories are grounded. My thesis will show 
that reading Black Nationalists as social theorists will not only serve to highlight what 
we are missing in political philosophy, but will also offer an important perspective on 
the ways in which academic philosophy can be used as a propaganda device. 
The two previous sections each worked to identify and criticize “white trust,” the 
disproportionate benefit of the doubt that whites receive in the state, in the media and in 
academia. To provide examples of thinkers who proceed without automatic white trust, 
this section introduces social theorists who have been heavily influential in Black 
Nationalist thought or who exemplify their critique of white supremacy in American 
political systems. The philosophers subjected to analysis in this section will be discussed 
through an examination of their political treatises that exemplify the main tenants of the 
Black Nationalist framework. 
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I will position Black Nationalism’s critique of the colonized status of African 
Americans within the broader field of Anti-Colonialism, much of which is not focused 
on the United States. American manifestations of Anti-Colonialism are visible in 
DuBois’s work and were clearly influential in the Black Power movement. Anti-
Colonialists like Fanon and Ce ́saire who experienced French colonization are 
ideologically united with Black Nationalists like Malcolm X in their shared belief that 
colonized subjects must create an independent base of power so as not to fall prey to 
counterproductive negotiations with whites. As a central figure in the “racial realist” 
school of Critical Race Theory, Bell is an incredibly useful resource in understanding the 
historical patterns that have led thinkers in this radical tradition to believe that anti-Black 
racism is permanently ingrained in the economic, political, and social structures of the 
United States. Bell shares with Black Nationalists Kwame Ture31 and Charles V. 
Hamilton the conviction that Black people must recognize “the ethnic basis of American 
politics as well as the power-oriented nature of American politics” in order to effectively 
confront white supremacy (Carmichael and Hamilton, 47). Critical Race Theorists like 
Derrick Bell of the racial realist tradition also share Black Nationalists’ understanding 
that racism is a permanent part of American and European political, social and economic 
structures. 
Thinkers in this tradition uniformly reject as myth the supposed inevitability of 
progress for people of color while they are still under the control of imperialist 
                                                
31 Kwame Ture was formerly known as Stokely Carmichael. The cited work Black Power: The 
Politics of Liberation in America was published under Ture’s former name. 
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governments. They argue that certain political and economic mechanisms (or 
“structures”) are consistently present where progress for African-descended people is 
tenaciously pursued to no avail. These structures—such as prisons—serve a protective 
function for the racist system to which they are closely connected. Black Nationalists 
believe that an honest evaluation of how these structures relate to systemic racism can 
produce a more plausible explanation for their past and present status as colonized 
subjects of Enlightenment-inspired, racist democratic governments.  
Black Nationalism is necessarily Anti-Colonial because it works to identify the 
values and methods of domination fundamental to what they understand to be an 
essentially imperialistic Euro-American culture. Franz Fanon and Aimé Césaire are 
instrumental in clarifying the basic principles of Anti-Colonialism.32 Fanon’s Wretched 
of the Earth is particularly well known for its powerful influence on Black Nationalist 
thought in the United States. Fanon’s Toward an African Revolution and Wretched of the 
Earth are the key texts for outlining Anti-Colonialism’s central political claims about 
how colonized subjects should and should not deal with the imperialistic governments 
that have been imposed on them. The question of using violence to resist colonization is 
a key issue in this discussion, and it has been the source of much contention with liberals 
who claim to otherwise be sympathetic with the plight of colonized people. Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr. problematized this heritage by taking a critical stance toward Black 
                                                
32 Additionally, the section of Black Skin White Masks in which Fanon defends of Césaire’s 
concept of “Negritude” against Sartre’s claims about racial authenticity in “Black Orpheus” 
exemplifies themes of Existentialism and Social and Political Philosophy in this tradition of 
thought. 
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Power, breaking with them primarily in his unwavering insistence on nonviolence. 
Because Black Nationalists and Anti-Colonialists like Fanon see their relationship to 
their colonizer as necessarily one of violence, they argue that nonviolence is an unfair 
and irresponsible expectation when struggling for liberation from oppressive regimes.    
Césaire’s Discourse on Colonialism is an essential text in this tradition. Like 
Fanon, Derrick Bell, Kwame Ture and Charles V. Hamilton, Ce ́saire lists consistent 
patterns of behavior definitive of the colonial style of contact. Ce ́saire draws on the 
history of colonialism when making the overarching diagnosis of Western civilization 
that is fundamental to his anti-colonial thought: “‘Europe’ is morally, spiritually 
indefensible.” With the destruction of a colonized people’s original culture comes the 
degradation (and often extermination) of the non-whites’ previous means of sustenance 
and system of values. A central project in Black Nationalism is to promote a deeper 
understanding of African history and culture so as to resist “Anglo-conformity,”33 an 
attitude that “sustain[s] racism” by “assum[ing] the ‘desirability of maintaining English 
institutions (as modified by the American Revolution), the English language, and 
English-oriented cultural patterns as dominant and standard in American life’” (62). In 
addition resisting indoctrination into white American values and assumptions, Black 
Nationalists uphold efforts to strengthen the Black community by creating parallel 
institutions when those controlled by whites consistently prove to be insufficient. The 
works on Black Power discussed here do not seek to function as blueprints for specific 
                                                
33 Ture and Hamilton discuss (62). They cite its use in Professor Milton M. Gordon’s book 
Assimilation in American Life (88).  
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programs but rather as a theoretical framework for understanding and resisting racist 
systems.  
Black Nationalists have expanded the Anti-Colonialist critique to encompass the 
colonial nature of American government and enterprise in their use of the internal 
colonization model. Black Nationalists in the U.S. generally understand themselves as 
being subject to what Robert Allen calls “domestic colonization.” Black Nationalists 
Ture and Hamilton compare whites’ international imperialist activities to the 
institutional racism experienced by African Americans. The case for domestic 
colonization is made by unveiling “constants” of colonialism addressed by Anti-
Colonialists and demonstrating their presence in the United States. In addition to their 
imperialistic practices abroad, the U.S. employs methods of domination that run parallel 
to the mechanisms dissected in Fanon’s “First Truths on the Colonial Problem” and 
other Anti-Colonialist writings. Anti-Colonialists analyze patterns in the history of 
Western colonialism and expose these recurrent themes of violence and exploitation. 
Fanon warns that these patterns remain despite the fact that colonial governments are 
gradually becoming more “jostled” by liberation movements and have had to adapt their 
strategies for controlling formally independent nations (African Revolution, 120). These 
efforts have been successful in maintaining the destructive “colonial style of contact” 
between these nations and their former occupiers, a phenomenon known as “neo-
colonialism.” A parallel is drawn between this concept of neo-colonialism and the 
American phenomenon that Allen calls “domestic colonization” in order to draw out the 
main tenants of Black Nationalism. This internal colonization model has been used by 
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social scientists like Kenneth Clark, who argues that “[t]he dark ghettos are social, 
political, educational, and—above all—economic colonies” (11). Anti-Colonialists and 
Black Nationalists use their insights about the flexibility of colonial structures to argue 
against future liberation movements that rely on these structures and on the good 
intentions of the colonizer.  
4.1 THE LEGACY OF ANTI-COLONIALISM IN AMERICAN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 
Before and after the institution of slavery was officially abolished, thinkers like 
Frederick Douglass, Ida B. Wells, Booker T. Washington, and W.E.B. DuBois were 
bravely publishing pieces in which the racism in American democracy was exposed and 
criticized. An early pioneer of theories on oppressive “accommodating structures” such 
as prisons, DuBois made enormous contributions to the field of sociology, providing 
empirical data that he contextualized politically and historically. Feagin writes that in the 
mid 1890s, he personally “conducted the first empirical study of urban Black 
Americans” in which “he combined survey research methods and a descriptive statistical 
analysis with some qualitative data and historical analysis of the community studied.” 
DuBois utilized some of these sociological and historical methods when he produced 
“The Souls of White Folk,” which was “the first major analysis in Western intellectual 
history to probe deeply White identity and the meaning of Whiteness” (Feagin 
“Introduction”, 11). This led to a broad examination of how material and political 
conditions influence values, ethics and philosophical movements. This multifaceted area 
of inquiry critically examines how whites think about themselves and behave toward 
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others who they have labeled as different. Thinkers in the Black Nationalist tradition are 
particularly interested in learning how systems of knowledge and values serve to justify 
violent behavior toward specifically targeted groups. 
“The Souls of White Folk” is in large part a treatise against the inherent value of 
whiteness. DuBois begins by exposing the ridiculousness of the white supremacist 
propaganda that seeks to “make children believe that every great soul in the world ever 
saw was a white man’s soul; that every great thought the world ever knew was a white 
man’s thought; that every great deed the world ever did was a white man’s deed; that 
every great dream the world ever sang was a white man’s dream” (Darkwater, 57). 
DuBois insists that this belief is entirely false and serves as a cover-up for Europe’s 
willingness to brutally manipulate international relations to its benefit. In order to justify 
this global dominance and the use of people of color for whites’ own cruel and selfish 
ends, white educational systems promote ignorance of all other cultures in order to cover 
up non-whites’ achievements. 
While “[t]he using of men for the benefit of masters is no new invention of 
Europe[,]...Europe proposed to apply it on a scale and with an elaborateness of detail of 
which no former world ever dreamed”(Darkwater, 67). By promoting anti-Black 
propaganda, whites created the first system of racialized chattel slavery on an enormous 
scale. Regarding the damage that has been done to Africa by whites, DuBois claims that 
“[t]he white followers of the meek and lowly Jesus” killed 85 million African descended 
people (68). As an adaptation to numerous uprisings, the white supremacy used to 
rationalize this behavior is gradually becoming more subtle. However, colonial 
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governments use predictable deceptive rhetoric to explain and protect their position 
throughout the globe. Anti-Colonialists uncover the concrete meanings of these terms by 
tracing the emergence of such terminology and noting the historical patterns associated 
with these terms. In “The Souls of White Folk,” DuBois writes that when “Herr 
Dernberg of the German Colonial Office called the agreement with England to maintain 
white ‘prestige’ in Africa,” this actually expresses “the doctrine of the divine right of 
white people to steal” (71). In addition to analyzing this rhetoric, he promotes historical 
narratives of European history that expose the mendacity behind whites’ accounts of 
their own actions as well as the important gaps in their historical and political 
generalizations. For example, DuBois describes how war finally broke out between 
white nations when tensions reached their pitch over European nations’ competition with 
each other over the territories, labor and resources obtained through centuries of 
imperialist conquest.   
Contrary to Europeans’ self-righteous, arrogant depictions of the progression of 
their societies, DuBois maintains that imperialism drives European history. In “The 
Souls of White Folk,” DuBois argues that the cause of the First World War was 
colonialism. He explains that “[t]he cause of war is preparation for war; and of all that 
Europe had done in a century there is nothing that equaled in energy, thought, and time 
her preparation for wholesale murder” (Darkwater, 69). This is not the typical account of 
the provocations of the World War, but this lack of insight is due to whites’ 
predisposition toward ignoring the suffering that they have inflicted on the rest of the 
world. Just as “the deliberately educated ignorance of white schools” explains the lack of 
78 
 
knowledge expected on historical figures of color, these wars receive little attention due 
to Europe’s self-centeredness as well as its embarrassment over the death and 
destruction that it has caused in the name of progress (64). This embarrassment is not a 
matter of guilt, but is rather results from its wounded arrogance inflicted by the 
exposition of this contradiction. Speaking to Germany’s hyped-up aggression in 
Belgium, DuBois insists that “[w]hat Belgium now suffers is not half, not even a tenth, 
of what she has done to black Congo…” (62-3). Yet, no other imperialist nation will 
seriously criticize what they are also doing and thus lend their silence to these enormous 
tragedies in history. Speaking to the recent atrocities, DuBois’s synopsis of the spirit of 
the white world parallel’s Ce ́saire’s in his claim that “[t]his is not Europe gone mad; this 
seeming Terrible is the real soul of white culture—back of all culture,—stripped and 
visible today” (63). DuBois also warns that the rise of Europe, due to its brutal use of 
technological methods of world conquest, will be accompanied by a greater fall, pointing 
to the First World War as an example.      
Césaire’s Discourse on Colonialism also subjects to analysis the destructiveness 
of white imperialist culture and explores the existential condition of colonized subjects 
who are forced to live according a social order that they know is built on deceit. His 
sharp analysis of the twisted neuroses behind the evil and deceitful spirit of imperialism 
is poetically applied to the kind of society that was built upon it. Incredibly important to 
this piece is previously mentioned concept of a colonial “style of contact,” which Fanon 
also addresses in detail in Toward the African Revolution. Césaire demands to know: 
“has colonization really placed civilizations in contact?” (33). Like Fanon, Césaire 
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unequivocally asserts the valueless nature of imperialist societies that destroy native 
cultures and commit genocide under the hypocritical guise of progress. The spirits of 
Toward the African Revolution and Discourse on Colonialism are the same, and are 
united most clearly in the following statements. Fanon writes, 
I see clearly what colonization has destroyed: the wonderful Indian 
civilizations—and neither the Deterding nor Royal Dutch nor Standard 
Oil will ever console me for the Aztecs and the Incas. (African 
Revolution, 101)  
Likewise, Césaire repudiates the hollow belief in the value of Western conquest by 
arguing that it cannot be properly understood apart from the tragic erasure of what could 
have been when he states: 
The port of Mers El Kebir and the Boufarik airfield for jet planes will 
never console us for the great intellectual, moral, and material 
wretchedness of our people. (42) 
Césaire argues that the colonial style of contact is introduced by the colonizer 
during the supposed progression of civilization (which of course presupposes that non-
whites are naturally uncivilized). In reality, “it is the colonized man who wants to move 
forward, and the colonizer who holds things back.” The “progress” purportedly brought 
about by this contact is in reality premeditated destruction. The progress myth is 
completely a-historical as well as belligerent in its disregard for contemporary 
circumstances: “The proof is that at present it is the indigenous peoples of Africa and 
Asia who are demanding schools, and colonialist Europe which refuses them” (46).  
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The imperialist West asserts itself as morally, intellectually, and religiously 
superior, but Césaire holds that this is debunked by the concrete consequences of their 
actions today and for centuries prior. For a civilization that asserts itself to be highly 
rational, white imperialists’ most brutal actions are oddly irrelevant to their analyses of 
their historical impact. As Césaire catalogues the genocide and oppression that 
accompanies the destruction of native peoples, art, culture, and language, he demands to 
know whether, “if these things are true, as no one can deny, will it be said, in order to 
minimize them, that these corpses don’t prove anything?”(41). Whites often respond that 
these atrocious acts of genocide do not prove anything about those Westerners who were 
indirectly involved, who never personally pulled any triggers or desecrated towns. 
Césaire’s retort encapsulates the main idea of his book, which is “the idea…that no one 
colonizes innocently, that no one colonizes with impunity either; that a nation which 
colonizes, that a civilization which justifies colonization—and therefore force—is 
already a sick civilization, a civilization which is morally diseased, which irresistibly, 
progressing from one consequence to another, one denial to another, calls for its 
Hitler…” (39). As long as the masses continue to participate in racism and profit from 
the racial subordination that necessarily follows, they are supporting the structures built 
on the ideology of white supremacy.   
Continuing Cesaire’s critique of Europe, Fanon lists in “First Truths on the 
Colonial Problem,” several of the conditions that imperialists impose on their subjects 
when a colony attempts to become independent (African Revolution, 120-6). The 
concept of Neo-colonialism is thus explained in terms of how oppressive structures 
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manage to adapt and remain deeply ingrained in a former colony’s politics, economy, 
and culture. Fanon provides a brilliant analysis of the problems inherent in popular 
methods of reform, giving special attention to Algeria and the FLN’s methods of 
resisting colonizers’ common but deceptive tactics. As these former colonies struggle for 
liberation throughout the twentieth century, Fanon asks how historians will think about 
the political upheavals of this era.  
In Toward the African Revolution, Fanon outlines the historical patterns and 
idiosyncrasies of imperialism in order to expose hollow promises that have quelled so 
many revolutions. By examining the oppressive mechanisms employed by colonialists 
who are being “[j]ostled by claims for national independence,” Fanon describes the 
dialectic by which newly independent nations still remain bound to their “former 
oppressor” (African Revolution, 121). Fanon does not see this dialectic as a necessary 
pattern, and he looks to Algeria for insight as to how colonial subjects can effectively 
disrupt a society’s distribution of power and prevent their colonizers from immediately 
regaining their balance.     
The first “condition” that Fanon seeks to lay bare in “First Truths on the Colonial 
Problem” is the expectation that the “rights” of the former colonizer to keep the 
properties wrongfully acquired during their reign of power be protected. When “former 
colonizers” keep their stolen resources and territory, they maintain the powerful position 
in society that was built on those things and thus continue to be occupiers in the most 
literal sense. Closely related is a second issue that always takes precedence in 
negotiations on independence: the idea that the rights of the occupier mean exactly those 
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rights which are withheld from the people as a condition of their “nominal sovereignty.” 
Fanon explains how “rights of the occupier” is double-speak (not his term) for the 
sacrifices made on behalf of the colonized, while “aid and assistance program” is code 
for economic stranglehold. Exploiting instability at every turn, Neo-colonialists feign 
benevolence in order to justify the influx of troops and use internal conflicts to justify 
their control of the economy at the expense of the public’s welfare. Thus ensues the 
dialectic of colonization in which independence is reluctantly conceded, unacceptable 
terms are laid out by the colonizer, and finally, “[o]nce the hours of effusion and 
enthusiasm before the spectacle of the national flag floating in the wind are past, the 
people rediscovers the first dimension of its requirement: bread, clothing, shelter” (122). 
Then, once their equilibrium is again disrupted by revolt, the colonizer moves to plan B 
and strategically strikes at its subjects’ weaknesses by exploiting their instability or 
through all-out war.  
The “second obstacle” to real independence is the colonizers’ use of “zones of 
influence” through which to maintain control of the colony’s land and resources. In the 
name of maintaining economic or political “order,” colonizers continue to occupy the 
nation because “the handling of their national riches by the colonized peoples 
compromises the economic equilibrium of the former occupant” (122).  Propagandistic 
language is examined in Fanon’s writings on zones of influence (the most obvious 
example being the use of the word “influence” rather than despotism). Zones of 
influence are created and maintained through “intervention,” which is double-speak for 
war. Zones of influence exist all over the globe, and are formally announced through 
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policies like Truman’s Monroe Doctrine in Latin America and Nixon’s Economic Aid 
Commission in Africa. Benevolent on its surface, “aid and assistance” is double-speak 
for imperialist large-scale theft and destruction of long-term economic potential.  
Western supremacy is the foundation for containment policies like those seen 
during the Cold War. This relates directly to existence of zones of influence, as nations 
are divided according to “the policy of the two blocs.” The “competitive strategy of 
Western nations” requires an absolute “with us or against us” framework for 
distinguishing Western territories from nations that have succumbed to communism. 
That means that all colonial struggles for independence are seen as communistic and are 
framed and treated as a direct threat to Western supremacy. The “third bloc,” however, 
seeks to create a new dimension in defiance of the two bloc world order. Fanon explains 
that the third bloc represents the position of newly independent nations struggling to 
avoid conflict and focus on its people’s welfare. Terms associated with the third bloc 
include “positive neutralism,” “non-dependence,” and “non-commitment.” This 
isolationist approach is essential for the well-being of a former colony’s people. Based 
examples like Toussaint’s revolution Haiti and Fanon’s analysis, Black Nationalists 
argue that diplomacy with an imperialist nation is nothing other than collaboration with 
an enemy who is intent upon your demise.  
The final constant of imperialism discussed in “First Truths on the Colonial 
Problem” is the “prestige of the West.” This refers to a psychological, hypnotic “beni-
oui-ouism” in which colonized people’s manipulated “yes-man” stance toward politics 
forces them to make catastrophic economic and cultural concessions to the colonizer 
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(125). C.L.R. James concludes his analysis of Haitian history in Black Jacobins by 
arguing that political independence is always unraveled without economic and cultural 
independence as well.   
In “Decolonization and Independence,” (African Revolution, 99-105) Fanon 
points to the French as one of the “jostled” nations of the twentieth century that is 
“hanging on” to its colonial position in Algeria. Fanon argues that the new phenomena 
apparent in the Algerian war are worth exploring. The FLN is unique in its unambiguous 
demands (not pleas or prayers) for independence. Because of their unwillingness to 
repeat the mistakes of other nominally sovereign former colonies through diplomacy, the 
FLN is criticized to the point that their mission and principles are shallowly understood 
if not completely overlooked. (A very similar problem exists regarding Black 
Nationalists such as the Black Panthers, and is largely due to the success of imperialist 
double-speak.) Fanon explains that “violence” really refers to the act of taking back what 
was stolen by colonizers, and “indecision” (directed at the FLN’s lack of colonial 
diplomacy) is double-speak for: “they didn’t choose the West.” Regarding the FLN’s 
militancy, Fanon writes that their singular “language of authority” is gained through 
combat. Fanon writes that the FLN is persistent in its desire to “rid the relations between 
the colonized and colonizer,” but doesn’t appeal to the shallow sympathy or inconsistent 
humanity of the French in order to do so.   
Regarding the place of the individual in the collective struggle for independence, 
Fanon insists that the independence of a nation is contingent upon the liberation of the 
individual. The FLN’s boldness in the face of colonial intimidation has inspired a new 
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consciousness in the colonized Algerian people on individual levels. This new 
personality is not based on self-effacement, nor does it seek to identify with the 
colonizer. The FLN is conscious of the fact that “progressive solutions” cause a people 
to unlearn the knowledge gained through previous struggles for independence. Buying 
into myths of gradualism only serves to “break the revolutionary torrent.” For all of 
these reasons, the “Algerian Revolution introduced a new style into the struggle for 
national liberation” by rejecting the colonial “style of contact” (104).  
Like Césaire, Fanon writes that “colonialism is fundamentally inexcusable” 
(101). This points to another unique phenomenon in the Algerian resistance, as the 
Algerians refuse to go along with the colonizers’ assertion of their positive value, 
arguing instead that there are only negative outcomes in the colonial style of contact. 
They therefore “refused to let the occupation be transformed into collaboration.” The 
FLN firmly demands independence, NOT occupation. These principles are central to 
Black Nationalism. 
4.2 THE NATIONALIST CRITIQUE OF CIVIL RIGHTS IDEOLOGY 
All of the Anti-Colonial and Black Nationalist thinkers discussed in this section 
emphasize the need to fight racism on a structural level. A recurrent question in the 
discipline is how to deal with the fact that formal progress does not have any necessary 
connection with lasting, meaningful change. Bell’s theory of interest convergence 
supports Black Nationalism’s conviction that white humanitarianism is an unreliable and 
unlikely source of progress. The predominant academic interpretation of Brown v. Board 
is one of the many blatant inaccuracies that emerge because of whites’ manipulation of 
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America’s undemocratic history to make it appear compatible with their political 
philosophy. 
DuBois’s later work emphasizes the historical reasons for resisting reformist and 
integrationist models for improvement. In “The Collapse of Europe,” DuBois promotes 
scholarship that resists the impatience and irresponsibility of a-historical analyses of 
contemporary social and political problems. According to DuBois, history has taught us 
that it is imperative for the colonized to tear themselves from the ideological, political 
and financial abuse carried out by white missionaries who invade Africa along with their 
respective nations. White missionaries who say they want to help simply cannot be 
relied upon. In a specifically American context, Kenneth Clark also expresses 
disillusionment with the possibility of gradual improvement through whites’ help. Clark 
writes that the inconsistent presence of social services often has a negative impact on 
those who would have been better served by being given the opportunity to learn how to 
help their own communities. This assigns individuals in need of assistance to the role of 
a perpetual client who does not have the tools to truly begin to treat the problems in the 
ghetto. Moreover, to help residents of the ghetto on a personal, attentive level goes 
against the economic interests of social workers who are rewarded in the form of class 
ascendancy for further removing themselves from those for whom they purport to work.  
The ideological abuses which he so eloquently catalogues in “The Souls of White 
Folk” have a decisive causal relationship with every-day oppression and must be resisted 
if colonized people are to resist colonialism’s historical patterns. Clark explains how this 
ideological abuse—manifested in the “pathology of the ghetto”—is largely a product of 
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the colonial status of African Americans. Within the ghetto resides a complex dynamic 
of hope, fear, despair, and resentment. The “alienation” that residents of the ghetto 
experience results from the mixture of these conflicting feelings as well as the racist, 
“one-way” communication between whites and blacks on separate sides of the wall. 
Clark goes on to explain that with this division comes whites’ expectation that blacks 
seek progress through ineffective means such as non-violence and the Civil Rights 
movement. However, Clark explains that “[n]o real revolt can be convenient for the 
privileged,” nor can cooperating with the oppressors by going through the white-
supremacist legal system lead to anything more than something along the lines of the 
Civil Rights Act, which “was so long coming it served merely to remind many Negroes 
of their continued rejected and second-class status” (17). Clark argues that what is 
needed instead is a new, self-affirming black identity that is contingent on a more 
substantial revolt, regardless of how problematic black militancy may be for white bigots 
and “liberals” alike.  
Sharing the Black Nationalist disillusionment with the Civil Rights Movement, 
Derrick Bell argues against the widely unquestioned myth of the inevitability of progress 
in American politics (“Racial Remediation”). He says that in reality, the “unstated, but 
firmly followed principle [which] has characterized racial policy decisions in this society 
for three centuries” is the maxim that “white self-interest will prevail over black rights.” 
This paints a gloomy but historically accurate picture of the potential for political 
struggles which happen within the system. Whites—conservatives and liberals—
typically buy into the inevitable progress myth which has been instrumental in keeping 
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black people oppressed in America. After making his case for why this unfortunate 
analysis of American history and its present political organization is true, Bell discusses 
strategies for improvement which bear these concerns in mind. Following this 
introduction, Bell devotes the second section, titled “Black Rights—White Benefits,” to 
demonstrating how his theory of interest convergence and the structural permanence of 
racism in America is the best method of explaining the historical cases that he describes, 
ranging from Brown v. Board to the close, disputed election between Hayes and Tilden 
in the wake of Radical Reconstruction.  
The patterns and common traps of colonial negotiations that Fanon described in 
Toward an African Revolution are discernable in the era following the American Civil 
War. Recall that the first issue that former colonizers address in negotiations is which 
rights of the former occupier will be protected in the wake of revolutionary struggle. 
Following the Civil War, southern whites were for the most part allowed to keep the 
wealth that they accumulated by enslaving African Americans. During the 
Reconstruction, the federal government ultimately chose to gratify whites’ racism by 
essentially agreeing not to intervene in racist political institutions and exploitative social 
practices. As members of the Black Power movement emphasize, whites are historically 
loyal to each other. Even though southern whites were the ones who committed treason 
and nearly tore apart the nation in a long, bloody civil war, African Americans were the 
ones who received “nominal sovereignty” while whites’ citizenship status was fully 
restored. Citing other scholarly support for his theory on how white self-interest (rather 
than whites’ benevolence and formal civil rights gains) is the most decisive cause of the 
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ebb and flow of racial progress, Bell refers to Professor C. Vann Woodward’s analysis 
of the compromise between whites in the North and South motivated by the election 
following the Civil War. Woodward writes that “[j]ust as the Negro gained his 
emancipation and new rights through a falling out between white men, he now stood to 
lose his rights through the reconciliation of white men” during this historical juncture 
(20).  
Bell’s work on Brown v. Board is central to understanding his disillusionment 
with formal progress. The failure of Brown provides a particularly poignant example of 
Bell’s racial realist theory of interest convergence because it shows how whites’ selfish 
motivation for the formal declaration of the unconstitutionality of segregated schools 
belies the myth of inevitable progress that keeps the corrupt American political system in 
place. Mary Dudziak provides ample evidence for the claim that self-interest motivated 
the passage of Brown (rather than, say, a change hearts and minds) in her article, 
“Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative.” Dudziak presents an air-tight empirical case 
for this claim by citing the amicus briefs and other recorded statements by public 
officials who openly confessed to using Brown as a public relations tool in order to 
defuse international criticism of the rampant lynching and Jim Crow segregation that 
dominated the American political scene. This international criticism was happening at a 
particularly inconvenient time in American history, as the true stories leaking out about 
whites’ horrible cruelty toward blacks in America gave legitimate ammo to communist 
nations and sympathizers to use in their criticisms of the sham that is the U.S. so-called 
democracy. Despite initial faith in its positive potential, Robert Carter also criticizes the 
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passage of Brown as a sham in his article, “The Warren Court and Desegregation.” It is 
important to keep in mind that Carter was initially willing to be optimistic about the 
possibility of progress following the passage of Brown. He was not, however, willing to 
allow whites’ grandiloquent, democratic rhetoric blind him to worsening conditions in 
the Black community. Whites’ more pleasant assumptions about reform are a privilege 
of their middle class environment as well as their faith in the ability of the system to 
undo its previously racist practices through egalitarian declarations.  
The lessons of history expose the shallowness and deliberate deceptiveness 
behind whites’ promises that future racial progress can and will happen through the 
democratic process. As pessimistic as this may appear on its surface, Bell contends that 
strategies for remediation must be informed by this history. Thus, these theories are 
meant to make struggles for liberation more productive rather than to give reason why 
black people should stop collectively resisting racial oppression. Also, Bell has argued 
that “most whites view the racial plight of blacks as an injustice that should be 
corrected.” A central message of his article is that the hierarchy of priorities that most 
whites also believe in unfortunately indicates that “racial equality, like whale 
conservation, should be advocated, but with the understanding that there are clear and 
rather narrow limits as to the degree of sacrifice or the amount of effort that most white 
Americans are willing to commit to either crusade” (23). However, Bell qualifies this 
analogy by pointing out that white people don’t have the same level of resentment for 
the whales as they have historically for African Americans.) Regarding the myth of 
inevitable progress, Bell points out that the white response to blacks’ progress often 
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directly increases whites’ level of resentment and is held up as proof that the system 
works, which allows whites to blame the victims of the racist system for their place 
within it. This is a crucial point because this “provid[es] the rationalizing link between 
the nation’s espousal of racial equality and its practice of racial dominance” (25). The 
“unspoken and totally facetious maxim” of equal opportunity and individual 
responsibility for one’s own fate is belied by the fact that “success for individual blacks 
demands exceptional skills exercised diligently in settings where their efforts will further 
or, at least, not threaten white interests.” Consequently, “no more than a small 
percentage of blacks is likely to be graced by so felicitous a set of circumstances” (24-5).  
In “The Integrationist Ethic as a Basis for Scholarly Endeavors,” Harold Cruse 
also provides a critique of the myth of inevitable racial progress. First, he points out 
buying into this myth (particularly in its American context) requires African Americans 
to have blind faith in the system that has caused their oppression, which in turn requires 
them to assume as whites ask them to that the system is not fundamentally broken. His 
article seriously calls into question the ideology that the system can and should be self-
policing despite the fact that it was designed by whites to uphold their privileged 
position and has directly and deliberately caused immeasurable death and suffering for 
people of color. 
When he was reaching the age of seventy, DuBois writes about his travels to 
Africa, in reporting that “West Europe is still determined to base its culture and comfort 
on underpaid labor and the virtual theft of land and materials by white investors” 
(Sundquist, 669). Like DuBois, C.L.R. James does not view Western democracies as 
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conducive to change, writing that “imperialists envisage an eternity of African 
exploitation” (376). (The imperialism that continues to this day supports this prediction.) 
C.L.R. James’s detailed historical account of the French occupation of Haiti shows that 
there is little reason to believe that becoming a citizen of the occupier’s empire ends the 
destructive impact of their colonial presence. Anti-Colonialists point to similar historical 
patterns and demand evidence (aside from Western democracies’ formal egalitarian 
declarations) that integrationist reform—rather than violent revolution—is a tenable 
option for the victims of colonialism.   
4.3 BLACK POWER 
Regardless of religious affiliations, Black Nationalists are united in their 
commitment to a socialist society. Jackson contends that because of their colonized 
status, “[t]he principle reservoir of revolutionary potential in Amerika lies in wait inside 
the Black Colony” (Blood, 10). Blacks should not use this potential to try to become a 
part of the white middle class, as true “[r]evolutionary change means the seizure of all 
that is held by the 1 percent, and the transference of these holdings into the hands of the 
remaining 99 percent” (11). Jackson rejects reform in a capitalist state as “bourgeois 
revolution.” (8). The rejection of reform is a central conviction of Black Nationalists 
including Malcolm X and Ture and Hamilton. Ture and Hamilton’s description and 
defense of Black Power comprises the theoretical lynchpin of my analysis of Black 
Nationalism. Ture and Hamilton define Black Power as “a call for black people in [the 
United States] to unite, to recognize their heritage, to build a sense of community” by 
beginning to “define their own goals, to lead their own organizations and to support 
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those organizations.” Following the Anti-Colonial critique of white culture, Black Power 
in the United States is “a call to reject the racist institutions and the values of this 
society” (44). 
Although Malcolm X’s views and associations with the Nation of Islam shifted 
over time, he is also an excellent resource on the unwavering convictions of Black 
Nationalism. When Malcolm X broke with the Nation of Islam, he founded the Muslim 
Mosque, Inc. The latter is clearly an organization associated with the Muslim faith, 
though Malcolm X assures Spellman that “the political philosophy of the Muslim 
Mosque will be black nationalism, the economic philosophy will be black nationalism, 
and the social philosophy will be black nationalism” (By Any Means, 27). Though he 
later changed his mind, Malcolm X means to endorse a political philosophy founded on 
“complete separation” (24-27). Regardless of his temporary “back-to-Africa 
separatism,” his position on improving the present situation in America is in line with 
other Black Nationalists who also see an independent power base as a necessity for the 
Black community. Eldridge Cleaver, Jackson and Malcolm X all ultimately wished to 
resolve divisions created by religious controversy and did not want Malcolm X’s break 
with the Nation of Islam to become the cause of strife among blacks, as their unified 
front against white domination was their only chance at achieving domestic 
decolonization.     
George Jackson is an example of someone who was clearly a political prisoner, 
having been sentenced to one year to life for supposedly committing robbery. Writing 
from prison, Jackson employed the genealogical method in order to understand 
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contemporary racism in terms of what Jackson called “neoslavery” (Soledad, 191). This 
inquiry yields knowledge about the causes of present problems so that Blacks can 
investigate whites’ rhetoric alongside the facts belied by their claims. Recall that Fanon 
described “neo-colonialism” as an adaptive method of governance used by colonizers 
who are being “jostled” by their subjects’ struggles for independence. Fanon traces the 
historical juncture at which neo-colonialism emerged by pointing to European 
colonizers’ deceptive, exploitative styles of negotiation and compromises following 
liberation movements. Fanon and Cesaire show that colonizers abroad create exceptions 
to independence or citizenship agreements which allow them to break their promises to 
respect newly won independence. These accommodating structures implemented by 
colonial powers include “aid and assistance programs” and military occupations 
allegedly intending to maintain law and order. Accommodating structures exist in the 
U.S. that are direct parallels to these used in international imperialist activities. Kenneth 
Clark and other social theorists who use the domestic colonialism model (discussed in 
the final section) in their analysis point out the problems with whites’ social services and 
DuBois extends this critique to encompass missionaries and white charities in Africa. In 
addition to deceptive domestic “assistance” programs are used to maintain whites’ 
financial exploitation and white’s police occupation in the ghetto is also justified on the 
grounds of maintaining order.   
Based on this history, Black Power advocates insist that an independent source of 
power is a necessary condition for prospect of meaningful political participation, 
freedom from violence and basic universal living standards. The need for Blacks to gain 
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an independent base of power economically, politically, socially and intellectually is 
centered on the corruptive nature of the American dream of individual monetary success. 
Ture and Hamilton argue that the middle class “is the backbone of institutional racism in 
this country” (41). Institutional racism is distinct from individual racism in that it 
upholds a “racial caste,” defined by Michelle Alexander is “a stigmatized racial group 
locked into an inferior position by law and custom” (12). Contrary to the individual 
racism which many whites would not publically support, institutional racism protects 
white privilege through “caste systems” meant to keep African Americans oppressed, 
including Jim Crow, slavery, and the prison system. Ture and Hamilton thus warn 
against trying to join the middle class, as they operate under a system of values “based 
on material aggrandizement, not the expansion of humanity” (40). Black Nationalists 
unequivocally “reject the goal of assimilation into middle-class America because the 
values of that class are in themselves anti-humanist and because that class as a social 
force perpetuates racism” (41). 
Informed by the history of colonialism in America and Europe, Black 
Nationalists and their predecessors also asked for an honest answer as to what methods 
of resistance are capable of significantly altering social, political and economic 
relationships. In Black Power: The Politics of Liberation, Ture and Hamilton illustrate 
the obstacles to reform by analyzing the failure of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic 
Party (MFDP) to empower African Americans by increasing their political participation. 
The MFDP formed in response to “the white racist-segregationist Mississippi 
Democratic Party, the major political force in the state” that “supported the suppression 
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of black people in every way” (88). Although the law is clear on the right of African 
Americans to vote, violent mobs and their white political allies have frequently 
prevented them from doing so. Ture and Hamilton explain that although the MFDP 
“abided by the law legally[,] they did not control the law politically” (91).  
Because “Might makes Law” as Ture and Hamilton argue, it is difficult to use the 
law against those with the power to change it or fail to enforce it. Despite the brutality of 
whites’ constant racist abuses of the legal system, Ture and Hamilton report that 
[f]requently, in the textbooks and classrooms, we are told that America is 
a ‘society of laws, not of men,’ the implication being, of course, that laws 
operate imartially and objectively, irrespective of race or other particular 
differences. This is completely inconsistent with reality. Law is the agent 
of those in political power; it is the product of those powerful enough to 
define right and wrong and to have that definition legitimized by ‘law’ 
(95).  
Ultimately, reform is valuable only insofar as the government’s renewed promise to 
follow its own fundamental laws is a cause for celebration. Philosophers in this tradition 
point out that the state is constantly breaking its own laws. Black Nationalists like Elaine 
Brown argue that the behavior and demands of the Black Power movement are in 
agreement with the law, particularly concerning the right to self-defense. Paul Robeson 
also publically demanded that the U.S. government uphold the constitution, including 
(but not limited to) the Second Amendment.  
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Black Nationalists argue that it is an injustice that white liberals essentially ask 
African Americans to unlearn history and embrace nonviolence as a plausible approach 
to meaningful change. Terrorized by lynching, changing the system in fundamental ways 
was understood a matter of necessity for the Black community. To suggest that 
nonviolent resistance appeals to whites’ consciences can eradicate the colonial style of 
contact (which is a constant threat to their existence) when these methods have 
repeatedly failed is another instance of an unethical epistemology. Malcolm X takes an 
ethical stand against the doctrine of nonviolence in Black liberationist organizations, 
arguing that those who profess this ideology in the Black community are doing a great 
disservice to those who are fighting for revolutionary change.  
Slavery clearly demonstrates that whites are not likely to collectively develop a 
guilty conscience and demand reform when they see Black people being abused, despite 
the popular myth that “White philanthropists...‘freed the slaves.’” According to DuBois, 
“enslaved African Americans brought their own liberation ‘by armed rebellion, by sullen 
refusal to work, by poison and murder, by running away to the North and Canada, by 
giving point and powerful example to the agitation of the abolitionists and by furnishing 
200,000 soldiers…in the Civil War’” (Feagin “Introduction”, 16).  Lincoln firmly 
believed in their inferiority and had originally offered to the South as a compromise a 
different version of the Thirteenth Amendment which would have permanently legalized 
slavery in existing slave states. (The South refused.) Following the Civil War, Lincoln 
made no effort to protect formerly enslaved African Americans, allowing the Southern 
states to implement the “Black Codes” and other laws that preserved the previous racial 
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order. Despite portrayals of Lincoln as a crusader against the oppression of African 
Americans, he had no intention of granting them political power, refusing to redistribute 
property and only conceding that “black soldiers who had fought gallantly during the 
Civil War or perhaps those few black men who showed particular ‘intelligence,’ might 
be awarded voting privileges” (Royster, 5). Violence was the only effective approach for 
enslaved African Americans to meaningfully influencing their fate—reform depends 
solely on the discretion and benevolence of those already in power.    
Because of the Civil Rights Movement’s reformist approach, activists like King 
acknowledged that they were unable to significantly alter exploitative economic 
relations and the Black community continued to be the target of systematic state 
violence. Addressing Angela Davis as a historian in a letter dismissing the merits of non-
violent reform, Jackson reminds her about  
how long and how fervently we’ve appealed to these people to take some 
of the murder out of their system, their economics, their 
propaganda….We’ve wasted many generations and oceans of blood 
trying to civilize these elements over here. It cannot be done in the 
manner we have attempted it in the past (Soledad, 216).  
Arguing that the continuation of state violence and unlivable economic conditions call 
for revolution rather than reform, Malcolm X similarly says, “I’ve never heard of a 
nonviolent revolution or a revolution that was brought about by turning the other cheek, 
and so I believe that it is a crime for anyone to teach a person who is being brutalized to 
continue to accept that brutality without doing something to defend himself. If this is 
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what the Christian-Gandhian philosophy teaches, then it is criminal—a criminal 
philosophy” (By Any Means, 31).  
Regarding the need for intellectual independence, Black Nationalists hold that 
white society is structured by incentives which cloud their ability to critically examine 
the meaning of their actions and the merits of the system in which they are heavily 
invested. This self-deception varies in degree of severity on a sliding scale, influenced 
by material greed as well as psychological “wages.” Malcolm X explains that the youth 
are particularly open to more radical challenges to central political and economic 
structures because they “have less stake in this corrupt system and therefore can look at 
it more objectively” (28). In this kind of discourse, Black Nationalists seek to answer in 
the philosophical question of how our position in society affects the ways in which we 
approach facts and shapes the criteria by which we judge which areas of inquiry are 
worth exploring. In Darkwater: Voices from within the Veil, DuBois shows that African 
Americans offer an indispensible perspective on the areas of inquiry that they pursue by 
necessity. His claim is that “those behind the veil of racial subordination can see much 
better into what Whites and White society are about, than Whites can see into the 
realities of racially subordinated groups” (Feagin “Introduction”, 10). 
In addition to their epistemologically privileged social position in the study of 
race relations, Black Power advocates contend that African Americans are in a unique 
position to influence the future. Addressing the “darker world that watches” as Europe 
tears itself apart after founding a culture on hatred, DuBois points out in “The Souls of 
White Folk” that non-whites “form two-thirds of the population of the world.” Thus, 
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“[i]f the uplift of mankind must be done by men, then the densities of this world will rest 
ultimately in the hands of darker nations” (Darkwater, 71).  Just as Fanon warns the 
colonized people of the world not to become another Europe in Wretched of the Earth, 
DuBois encourages the majority of humanity to distinguish themselves from whites by 
taking pride in the declaration of their distinct racial identity. This focus on embracing a 
Black identity resists the self-hatred that whites have tried to teach Blacks for centuries. 
Through the development and nurturing of Black history and culture, Blacks can resist 
the “pathology of the ghetto” produced by whites’ colonial exploitation and violence. 
Fanon writes in “Decolonization and Independence” that colonial people must not seek 
freedom from whites through whites, but should set aside the goal of integration into 
white society and values in favor of becoming “a liberated individual who undertakes to 
build the new society” after independence is won through violent struggle (African 
Revolution, 102).   
4.4 CONCLUSION 
The treatment of Black Nationalists as social theorists is indispensible in 
contemporary political philosophy. By consulting these thinkers’ representative texts, 
my objective has been to demonstrate that this tradition offers a historical accuracy and 
vigilance missing from other philosophers in academia who speak to issues of race and 
racism. It is important to be familiar with most of these thinkers when making claims 
about whites’ racism, as their concepts cannot be articulated through canonized (and 
white) philosophy. In his critique of the integrationist ethic, Cruse argues that faith in 
whites’ ability to be self-policing is reflected in their ideology which “was obviously 
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predicated on an intellectual consensus which held that the political, economic, and 
cultural values of the Anglo-American tradition were sufficiently creative and viable 
enough to sustain the American progression to realization of its ultimate potential” 
(Cruse, 4). His vision for black studies involves drawing a distinction between 
revolution (institutional, substantive improvement) and gradual reform, the latter 
obviously being the preferred method for whites.  
Curry writes on the consequences of this intellectual colonization in his article 
“On Derelict and Method: The Methodological Crisis of African American Philosophy's 
Study of African Descended Peoples under an Integrationist Mileu.” His project is first 
to show how academic philosophers (despite the growing amount of scholarship on race) 
“remain mired in the need to negotiate with the conceptual fantasies of [African 
Americans’] oppressors and hopelessly enchanted by the traumatic neglect of white 
thinking about Blackness” (19). Next, he argues that this does real harm to the academic 
field of Africana Philosophy by demonstrating how the conceptual confinements of the 
mainstream, white-dominated academic paradigm of integration only serves to uphold a 
theoretical framework that largely apologetic and not concerned with concrete change. 
This causes harm on two levels. As Curry shows, white theories cannot and have never 
been able to accurately portray the realities that African Americans face. This leads to a 
“conceptually dehumanizing” paradigm for scholarship on race (Curry “On Derelict”, 
19). This is true in spite of the fact that African American Philosophy has begun to be 
gradually more included in academic philosophy, as scholars in this field are expected to 
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primarily respond to and critique whites’ theories while whites are not expected to have 
any working knowledge of the field of Africana philosophy. 
Cruse says it best when he writes that “the present internal social and racial crisis 
we are experiencing proves beyond a doubt the failure of this integrationist ethic” (19). 
The method of philosophy seen here involves subjecting theories which are uncritically 
accepted in mainstream academia to analysis by appealing to concrete situations and 
social facts. These writers promote the further development of this methodology which 
seeks to draw out myths and contradictions—i.e. propaganda—in political philosophy. 
The primary conclusion regarding future standards for methodology is to affirm the 
value of blacks’ analysis of their social position (by studying and citing one another) 
rather than seeking legitimating from white philosophers who are unconcerned with (and 
uneducated on) the problem of racism which African American philosophers have been 
working on for centuries. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
In the field of philosophy, colonized individuals wishing to participate in the 
mainstream academic discourse are expected to draw upon canonized Western texts and 
methods of inquiry by showing how these ideals encompass their own worldviews. 
Plato’s “Myth of the Cave” is the quintessential canonized academic text, and is meant 
to serve as an allegory for the ways in which inherited, unchallenged assumptions 
generate intellectual confinement. The rebellious ideals espoused by Nietzsche on the 
petty tactics of the weak to assert control over the strong contain elements that may 
resonate with those who have struggled against mass society’s manipulative approach to 
ideological indoctrination. But how do these widely-admired lessons speak to those 
whose chains are literally real, to those who must live according their captors’ 
assumptions while remaining conscious of the fact that their captors’ dominant values 
are corrupt?  
The colonized for centuries have had a great deal to say about these questions. 
The philosophical method unique to colonized persons is a product of their social 
conditions and concrete constraints—sometimes literally in the form of chains. The 
colonized are positioned in such a way that they can aspire to break their chains but are 
still limited to a geographical space, nation, or imperialist framework—“the cave” in 
which they incarcerated. They see that those incarcerating them are not themselves in 
chains, and rather than shadows they find themselves constantly staring directly into the 
faces of their captors. Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire do not emphasize a return to the 
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pre-colonial past in which native cultures are intact, as this is impossible. The 
philosophy teacher who would drag them out of the cave and into the sunlight is himself 
in chains, and the colonized know that they are being lied to but are limited in their 
capacity to change the liars by whom they are involuntarily surrounded.   
Regardless of whether one agrees with Bell in saying that racism is permanent, it 
is clear that whites’ racism is ideologically powerful enough to consistently motivate 
them to create accommodating structures to absorb progressive challenges. Historical 
genealogical methods are used by Black Nationalists in order to overcome false 
assumptions about civilizations by looking at what whites have done and said in the past 
in order to make sense of the apparent conflict between their contemporary rhetoric and 
their continued exploitation of African descended people. Black Nationalists work to 
break free of the chains of colonialism by first forming a theoretical framework through 
which to investigate which paths to progress are mythical, and which ideals of Western 
society are hollow. 
In her autobiography, Angela Davis invokes the mythical Roman god Janus34 to 
describe the uncertain historical juncture between the unchangeable “violent, confining 
past broken only by occasional splotches of meaning” and her uncertain future, “glowing 
with challenge, but also harboring the possibility of defeat” (106). Like the two faces of 
                                                
34 The use of ancient Greek and Roman myths is a long-established method of conveying 
philosophical ideas and has been used by canonical thinkers such as Freud. It is quite common in 
the field of aesthetics, particularly among the German Romanticists Friedrich Hölderlin, Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe, Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller, and Arthur Schopenhauer, who 
use the myth of Tantalus in their poetry and in their philosophy. These myths were seen as 
having deep political significance by F. Schlegel and other Romanticists. 
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Janus facing in opposite directions, Davis struggled with how the open question of the 
future might be fettered by the chains of her past. Joy James invokes Davis’s imagery of 
the Janus head and relates this metaphor to other tensions between hope and fear in 
American history. In one application, the Janus head “represents hypocrisy and denial, a 
‘two-facedness’ manifest when states or political systems claim democratic principles 
while systematically disenfranchising marginalized peoples or political minorities” 
(James “Introduction”, 2). Firmly rejecting the historically unsuccessful strategies for 
reform-based mobilization, Black Nationalists remain vigilant of the significant 
incongruities in whites’ brutal practices and the grandiloquent humanitarian speech 
produced by their most prominent thinkers. Black Nationalists seek to empower others to 
understand and begin to more effectively address these tensions.  
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